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Addressing the Next State Fiscal Crisis:
Toward an Ex Ante Scheme of Federal Assistance
to States in Fiscal Distress
Omer Kimhi
Every several years, usually after a national recession, and
also as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, states enter financial
difficulties. These difficulties spur a debate, both in the political
arena and in the academic literature, concerning the appropriate
federal response. Some advocate for federal bailouts to rescue the
distressed states, while others argue that the states need to deal
with their troubles independently or with the help of state
bankruptcy legislation. The Article explores the proper federal
response to states’ fiscal crises.
The Article argues that the current (suggested) responses—
state bankruptcy and ex-post discretionary federal bailout—are
problematic solutions. On the one hand, a bankruptcy procedure
is inadequate to deal with state economic crises, but on the other
hand discretionary bailouts often come too late and create moral
hazard and political agency concerns. Instead of these ex-post
solutions, the Article suggests the adoption of an ex ante federal
assistance scheme. This scheme employs automatic fiscal
stabilizers and the Federal Reserve’s authority as a lender of last
resort, in order to assist states to deal with economic downturns
as they develop. It is designed to induce the recovery of the states’
and the national economies by enabling states to address their
fiscal crises without implementing destructive contractionary
measures.
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INTRODUCTION
In the first few months following the break of the COVID-19
pandemic, state economies were in dire straits. The COVID-19
pandemic created not only a health crisis but also an economic
crisis, and states’ economies were particularly vulnerable.1 In the
second quarter of 2020, the real gross domestic product of all fifty
states decreased—from 20.4% in Washington, D.C., to 42.2% in
Nevada and Hawaii.2 The pressures on state budgets come in a
pincer movement. On one hand, state governments are responsible
for various services for which the demand has risen considerably
as a result of the virus (such as health services and unemployment
insurance). This increases states’ costs and strains their budgets.3
1. Michael Ettlinger & Jordan Hensley, COVID-19 Economic Crisis: By State, CARSEY
SCH. OF PUB. POL’Y (Oct. 22, 2021), https://carsey.unh.edu/COVID-19-Economic-ImpactBy-State.
2. Gross Domestic Product by State, 2nd Quarter 2020, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS
(Oct. 2, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-state2nd-quarter-2020.
3. Robin Rudowitz, COVID-19: Expected Implications for Medicaid and State Budgets,
KFF (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/covid-19-expected-implicationsmedicaid-state-budgets/; COVID-19 Has Caused a Surge in Spending on Unemployment
Insurance, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2020/
10/the-coronavirus-has-led-to-a-surge-in-spending-on-unemployment-compensation.
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On the other hand, due to the slowdown of economic activity, state
revenues have dramatically decreased. The Brookings Institute
projects that state and local revenues will decline $155 billion in
2020 (5.5%), $167 billion in 2021 (5.7%), and $145 billion in 2022
(4.7%).4 Dwindling revenues are insufficient to cover mounting
costs, and budget shortfalls are mounting.5
The looming state economic crisis has spurred a debate about
the proper federal response.6 One position, often represented by
governors or Congressional Democrats, advocates for massive
federal aid to distressed states.7 In talks regarding the second
COVID-19 stimulus, for example, Democrats pushed for more than
$900 billion in federal aid to states, reasoning that states are unable
to cope independently with their financial troubles.8 Without
federal funds, argue the proponents of federal assistance, states
may collapse, bringing the nation’s economy with them.9 The other
position, often represented by congressional Republicans, objects to
using federal funds for state bailouts.10 According to this view,
4. Louise Sheiner & Sophia Campbell, How Much Is COVID-19 Hurting State and Local
Revenues?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/09/24/how-much-is-covid-19-hurting-state-and-local-revenues/; see also States
Grappling with Hit to Tax Collections, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-2-20sfp.pdf.
5. Elizabeth McNichol & Michael Leachman, States Continue to Face Large Shortfalls
Due to COVID-19 Effects, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (last updated July 7, 2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/states-continue-to-face-large-shortfallsdue-to-covid-19-effects; Scott Cohn, Cuts to Basic Services Loom as Coronavirus Ravages
Local Economies and Sends States into Fiscal Crisis, CNBC (July 7, 2020, 8:16 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/07/states-in-fiscal-crisis-cuts-to-basic-services-loomdue-to-pandemic.html.
6. Joseph Zeballos-Roig, Trump Says Another Stimulus Package Will Be Passed After the
Election. Here Are 7 Areas of Disagreement Between Republicans and Democrats Holding up $1,200
Checks, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 3, 2020, 9:52 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/republicansdemocrats-stimulus-disagreements-pelosi-trump-mcconnell-aid-bill-differences-2020-10;
Jordain Carney, State Aid Emerges as Major Hurdle to Reviving COVID-19 Talks, HILL (Aug. 10,
2020, 6:22 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/511400-state-aid-emerges-as-majorhurdle-to-reviving-covid-19-talks.
7. See Carney, supra note 6; see also Erik Wasson & Laura Davison, House Democrats
Unveil $3 Trillion Aid Bill with Cash for States, BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2020, 4:09 PM),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/house-democrats-propose-3-trillionpandemic-relief-plan.
8. Wasson & Davison, supra note 7; Carney, supra note 6.
9. Mark Zandi, The Entire Economy Will Sink if the Federal Government Doesn’t Bail Out
States, CNN (May 19, 2020, 8:23 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/19/perspectives/
state-government-bailout/index.html.
10. Carney, supra note 6.
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states should handle their own finances, and federal funds should
not be handed out to poorly-managed (“blue”) states.11 In lieu of
federal aid, a state bankruptcy solution is offered.12 Bankruptcy law,
it is argued, can reduce the states’ debt overhang and spread their
losses among their creditors, obviating the need for federal funds.13
But both of the suggested federal responses, bankruptcy law
and ex post federal aid, seem problematic. As I will show in detail
in this Article, a bankruptcy process is often insufficient to solve
states’ fiscal crises. To revive a distressed state’s economy, federal
funds are usually needed; otherwise, not only does the distressed
state itself suffer but, perhaps more importantly, the national
economy is harmed. Conversely, as those who oppose federal aid
argue, providing federal aid to a distressed state ex-post (after a
crisis has developed) can do more harm than good. It probably will
increase the state’s spending in the long run, and it is often
distributed on the basis of political interests rather than economic
considerations. To address these problems, this Article offers a
third solution: an ex ante scheme of federal assistance. This scheme,

11. President Trump was quoted as saying about potential federal aid to states due to
the pandemic, “It’s not fair to the Republicans because all the states that need help—they’re
run by Democrats in every case. Florida is doing phenomenal, Texas is doing phenomenal,
the Midwest is, you know, fantastic—very little debt.” Ebony Bowden & Steven Nelson, BlueState Coronavirus Bailouts Are Unfair to Republicans, Trump Says, N.Y. POST (May 5, 2020, 6:00
AM), https://nypost.com/2020/05/05/trump-blue-state-coronavirus-bailouts-are-unfairto-republicans/. Tennessee Senator Marsha Blackburn tweeted, “NY and other left wing
states have been terribly mismanaged for years. Kowtowing to labor unions by approving
generous taxpayer funded benefits in exchange for votes has left them with billion dollar
shortfalls. Blame yourself @NYGovCuomo, not @senatemajldr.” Marsha Blackburn
(@MarshaBlackburn), TWITTER (Apr. 23, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://twitter.com/
marshablackburn/status/1253372953208782851?lang=en.
12. Mitch McConnell, the Senate Republican majority leader, said: “I would certainly
be in favor of allowing states to use the bankruptcy route. It saves some cities. And there’s
no good reason for it not to be available.” David Frum, Why Mitch McConnell Wants States
to Go Bankrupt, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/04/why-mitch-mcconnell-wants-states-go-bankrupt/610714/. Similar opinions were
voiced by Republicans during the previous state crisis during the Great Recession. See Jeb
Bush & Newt Gingrich, Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2011, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2011-jan-27-la-oe-gingrich-bankruptcy20110127-story.html.
13. Support for a state bankruptcy route is not solely political. Academics also support
the idea, albeit with more profound and elaborate economic and legal reasons for their view.
See, e.g., David Skeel, State Bankruptcy Revisited, 45 NAT’L AFFS. (Summer 2020),
https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/state-bankruptcy-revisted.
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I believe, can provide the necessary federal aid, but without (or
with fewer of) the problems associated with such aid.
To explain the need for and the advantages of the proposed ex
ante federal assistance scheme, the Article will develop an
argument in four stages. In the first, I will explain that states, in
contrast with corporations, individuals, and municipalities, don’t
need the protection of federal bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law is
designed to protect debtors when they don’t pay their debts, but
existing law already immunizes states. Their creditors cannot sue
them if they default on their obligations or repudiate their debt, and
their assets are already protected from execution.14
After explaining the inadequacy of bankruptcy law, I will
explain why, unlike bankruptcy, federal assistance is imperative for
the resolution of most state crises. Usually when the national
economy goes south, states’ economies suffer twofold—their
expenditures rise due to increased demand for welfare services
(such as Medicaid or unemployment insurance), while their
revenues decrease due to higher unemployment and diminished
business activity. As a result, states don’t have the resources to
finance their rising costs, and a state economic crisis develops. The
problem is that, as opposed to the federal government, states lack
adequate authorities to address such crises. Whereas the federal
government has both monetary and fiscal tools at its disposal to
propel the economy, states don’t possess such policy-making
instruments. They cannot independently implement the
expansionary monetary or fiscal policies required to help their
economies, and on the contrary, they are forced to implement
retrenchment measures in order to meet statutory balanced budget
requirements. Thus, opposite to the directives of standard
economic theory, in times of recession states cut spending and
investments, and these measures damage not only the distressed
states, but also the national economy. They increase
unemployment, decrease consumption, and stifle growth. Without
sufficient economic resources, the distressed states economies
deepen the recession and inhibit the economy’s rehabilitation.15
Nobel Prize laureate Paul Krugman, for example, has explained
that insufficient federal aid to states in the Great Recession caused
14. See infra text accompanying notes 37–49.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 77–149.
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states to implement contractionary policies, which have been
“a major drag” on the overall economy’s rehabilitation.16 The same
is true of the current COVID-19 crisis.
Federal aid is thus necessary to give distressed states the
resources they need to encourage consumption and recover both
their and the national economy in times of crisis. But federal aid
also has a dark side. The next stage of the argument explains the
problems associated with federal aid and why it is so fiercely
objected to. First, as emphasized by opponents of federal bailouts,
federal aid creates moral hazard problems. If states know that the
federal government will provide financial assistance when they fall
on hard times, they have little motivation to save or follow prudent
financial policies.17 Second, and no less importantly, the Article
shows that because federal aid is provided through a political
process, it is dispensed according to politicians’ personal interests
and not necessarily pursuant to the beneficiaries’ financial needs.
Federal funds are spent, but they do not reach those who need them
the most, but rather those who are politically connected.18 This was
true of the federal aid provided by the Obama administration in the
Great Recession, and it was probably even more true of the Trump
administration’s COVID-19 stimulus.19
This analysis exposes a paradox in fiscal federalism. On one
hand, due to the nature of federalism, states lack the fiscal and
monetary tools necessary to stabilize fiscal crises. On the other
hand, when the federal government tries to assist, it can do more
harm than good. The assistance usually arrives too late, it is liable
to create future bailout expectations, and the allocation of funds is
usually based on politics. The last stage of the argument thus
proposes a way out of this paradox: an ex ante federal assistance
scheme. The scheme has two components, the first a more
expansive use of automatic fiscal stabilizers and the second a more
expansive use of the Federal Reserve’s (“Fed”) authority as a lender
of last resort. The first component, automatic stabilizers, induces a
federal response under certain conditions (“automatic triggers”) set
by the federal government ex ante (before a crisis has occurred).
16. Paul Krugman, The Austerity Debacle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/opinion/krugman-the-austerity-debacle.html.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 176–189.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 190–212.
19. See infra notes 203–212.
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When a state meets these conditions, such as a certain level of
unemployment or a certain increase in the demand for Medicaid, it
will automatically receive federal aid without the need for a long
discretionary political process. The Article details the various
advantages of automatic stabilizers, among which are their timely
implementation, their transparency, and the fact that the aid is
dispensed with less involvement of political interests. Automatic
stabilizers also diminish moral hazard concerns because they can
be set such that they are not under the control of state politicians or
politicians have little interest in reaching them. The second
component is designed to enable states to receive federal aid if the
automatic stabilizers are not triggered or they do not allow for
sufficient assistance. In these cases, I suggest, a state should be able
to approach the Fed and ask for an emergency loan to help it deal
with the crisis. The Fed should grant the loan if the requesting state
meets certain conditions determined ex ante, especially when the
Fed determines that the crisis was caused in large part by factors
beyond the state’s control (as occurred during the Great Recession
and in the current COVID-19 crisis). This way deserving states
could receive emergency funds, but without moral hazard or
political considerations.
The Article contributes to the literature on states’ fiscal distress
in several ways. First, whereas much of the legal literature thus far
has focused on the question of state bankruptcy,20 the Article aims
to shift the debate to the ways that federal aid should be dispensed
in times of distress. I argue that a state bankruptcy procedure is
inadequate to deal with many state economic crises and the
assistance of the federal government is often imperative. Second,
the Article acknowledges the problematic aspects of federal
20. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012)
[hereinafter Skeel, States of Bankruptcy]; David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for
Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063 (2013) [hereinafter Skeel, Is Bankruptcy the
Answer?]; Clayton P. Gillette, Bankruptcy and Its By-Products: A Comment on Skeel, 50 HOUS. L.
REV. 1129 (2013); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 322 (2011); Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign
Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888 (2012); David E. Solan, State Bankruptcy: Surviving a Tenth Amendment
Challenge, 42 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REV. 217 (2012); Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young,
The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2012);
Richard M. Hynes, State Default and Synthetic Bankruptcy, 87 WASH. L. REV. 657 (2012);
Veronique de Rugy & Todd J. Zywicki, The Difficult Path to State Bankruptcy (June 10,
2020), Mercatus COVID-19 Response Policy Brief Series, available at SSRN,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3698742.
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assistance, thereby exposing the paradox of fiscal federalism. On
one hand, fiscal federalism deprives states of necessary tools to deal
with state economic crises that are rooted in national recessions, but
on the other hand, if and when the federal government tries to help
distressed states, it is likely to create a different set of problems in
the long run. Third, and perhaps most important, the Article
suggests a solution to the paradox: an ex ante federal assistance
scheme. This scheme enables the provision of federal aid in a more
efficient and organized manner. Note that although the Article was
written during the COVID-19 crisis, it is relevant to state crises in
general. Many of the examples and much of the literature cited in
the Article refer to past state crises, and I believe the analysis and
proposed solutions will be relevant to future crises.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I examine the
rationales for bankruptcy legislation and the need (or lack thereof)
for federal bankruptcy legislation for states. Part II explains the
need for federal aid in times of state crisis, Part III deals with the
problems associated with it, and Part IV details the ex ante federal
assistance scheme solution. Part VI concludes.
I. A WORLD WITH STATE BANKRUPTCY
In his seminal article in 1987, Douglas Baird imagined a world
without bankruptcy.21 He explained that “[t]he reason for engaging
in this thought experiment is . . . to isolate bankruptcy issues from
other issues.”22 He wanted his readers to understand why we need
bankruptcy law and why a world without bankruptcy would be
less efficient and welfare enhancing. In this Part of the Article, I
engage in the flip side of the same exercise with respect to state
bankruptcy. I imagine a state in financial distress and look at
whether the adoption of a state bankruptcy mechanism (“a world
with state bankruptcy”) would be helpful to the distressed state.
Below, I discuss the application of the prevailing justifications
offered for bankruptcy law—corporate, individual, and
municipal—to state bankruptcy. I show that a world with state
bankruptcy is not much different than the world, as it is now,
without it. The law already protects states from actions by creditors

21. Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1987).
22. Id. at 174.
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to collect debts, and, unlike corporations or individuals, states do
not need bankruptcy to maximize their value or rehabilitate.
A. The Inapplicability of Bankruptcy Law to States
Corporate bankruptcy is usually justified through the
contractual theory of bankruptcy law put forward by Thomas
Jackson and Douglas Baird (the creditors’ bargain theory).23 At the
heart of the contractual theory lies the common pool problem.24
In a world without corporate bankruptcy, since state law
prioritizes creditors on a first-come-first-served basis, creditors are
incentivized to execute on debtor’s assets as quickly as they can.
This pushes debtors into inefficient liquidations because
individual creditors have an interest in individually grabbing
assets, even if from the perspective of a group of creditors it would
be better to sell the debtor as a going concern (“the common pool
problem”).25 Corporate bankruptcy law is designed to address this
problem. When a bankruptcy petition is filed, an automatic stay
precludes the commencement or continuation of any individual
legal action against the debtor. This enables creditors to maximize
the value they receive from insolvent debtors as a group and
thereby to decrease the price creditors demand for the extension of
credit ex ante.26
This rationale, however, does not apply to state bankruptcy. In
the context of states, a common pool problem does not exist
because, even without an automatic stay, creditors are unable to
execute on the state’s assets. Courts prohibit creditors of municipal
debt to execute on municipal assets when such execution would
impair the municipality’s ability to perform its public duties for
the benefit of its residents,27 and presumably this prohibition
23. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982); Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 439, 444 (1992); John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy
Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 53, 66 (1995).
24. Jackson, supra note 23; Baird, supra note 21.
25. Jackson, supra note 23; see also Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation,
and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399,
402–03 (1986).
26. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 861–68; see also THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 1–19 (1986).
27. Estate of DeBow v. City of E. St. Louis, 592 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
Lee v. City of Fairfield, 145 So. 669 (Ala. 1933); Capps v. Citizens’ Nat’l Bank, 134 S.W. 808
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also applies to state assets.28 With no possibility of grabbing
assets essential to the state’s function, there are no inefficient
liquidations. There is no common pool problem, and state
bankruptcy is not required to stop creditors from behaving in a selfdestructive manner.29
If the justification for corporate bankruptcy does not apply to
states, perhaps state bankruptcy is required to reduce debt
overhang.30 According to this line of reasoning, during times of
financial distress, both corporate and individual debtors may have
too much debt in relation to their income (“debt overhang”). Due
to the debt overhang, debtors do not have sufficient resources for
consumption or investments (too much of their income is used to
service existing debt), and creditors are unwilling to extend new
credit.31 Seemingly, this reasoning could also apply to states.32
States are likely to incur large amounts of debt, and the debt
payments may prevent them from providing essential services to
their residents. Their financial situation precludes them from
obtaining new debt, and they cannot implement reforms or
improve their financial affairs.33 Indeed, the debt overhang
problem may be particularly severe with respect to states, because,
like individuals, states cannot be liquidated. They continue to
operate notwithstanding overwhelming amounts of debts, and
they need a mechanism for debt relief in order to recover.34 In
theory, bankruptcy law could provide such mechanism.35 Through
bankruptcy, states could readjust their debts and use a breathing
spell to reorganize and develop revenue sources for the future.
Bankruptcy could also provide debt discharge, which would allow
(Tex. Civ. App. 1911); ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT
FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE § 5.4.4, at 252 (1992).
28. Clayton P. Gillette, What States Can Learn from Municipal Insolvency, in WHEN
STATES GO BROKE 99, 113–14 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012).
29. See Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 20, at 685–86; Gelpern, supra note 20,
at 902–03.
30. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 20, at 687.
31. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1557 (2013); see also Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J.
DEV. ECON. 253 (1988) (regarding sovereign debtors).
32. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 20, at 688; Gelpern, supra note 20, at 926.
33. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 20.
34. Id. at 683.
35. Id. at 687–89 (“The discussion thus far has identified the reduction of debt
overhang as the principal justification for a bankruptcy framework for states.”).
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the elimination of pre-petition debt altogether and give states a
fresh start.36
Though states, like other debtors, may suffer from the
consequences of debt overhang, a distressed state, unlike other
debtors, does not need bankruptcy law for debt relief and a fresh
start. Individuals and corporations need the protection of
bankruptcy law because their creditors will sue them if they
unilaterally decide to default or repudiate their debts. States, on the
other hand, can delay payments or even eliminate their debts
altogether, and their creditors will be unable to recover their losses
because of states’ immunity.
Immunity from suits in federal courts is granted to states under
the Eleventh Amendment.37 Pursuant to the Amendment, creditors
are barred from initiating litigation against a state in a federal court,
so creditors have no federal remedy when a state defaults or
repudiates.38 Vindication of creditors’ rights may be equally
difficult in state court. The question of state court immunity largely
depends on the law in each individual state, which differs widely
from one state to another. Although some states, like Mississippi,
have determined that when the state enters into a contract it
implicitly waives its immunity with respect to breach of contract,39
36. Id.
37. The language of the Eleventh Amendment seems to bar only suits brought by
citizens of another state, but the Supreme Court interpreted the prohibition broadly and also
denied suits brought by the state’s own citizens. See generally, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890); Johnson & Young, supra note 20, at 150.
38. Although immunity can be waived by the state, such waivers, even to the extent
they are included in the terms of the bonds, were interpreted to apply only to state courts.
See Johnson & Young, supra note 20, at 150; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
241 (1985) (“The test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federalcourt jurisdiction is a stringent one. Although a State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity
may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by
the Eleventh Amendment.”). Johnson and Young suggest two ways that Eleventh
Amendment state immunity could be bypassed, but both ways require congressional
intervention. The first is that Congress will induce states to waive their immunity more
broadly to allow bondholders to bring suits against states in federal courts. Such
congressionally induced waivers, they argue, will be analyzed using the Court’s test in South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), under which courts were less willing to strike down the
waivers. The second way is a statutory abrogation of the state’s immunity, which, under
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), could be done when Congress wishes to reinforce
the reconstruction amendments. Johnson & Young, supra note 20, at 151–52. Such
congressional assistance involves, however, federal political considerations, which, as I
discuss later in the Article, are problematic in the context of bankruptcy and bailouts.
39. See Gillette, supra note 28, at 113.
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other states, like Arkansas, maintain their immunity.40 Dependency
on state law is problematic, however, because a state, theoretically
at least, could change its law, or even its constitution, before a
default, giving itself general or ad hoc immunity and then giving
itself a debt discharge without creditors being able to go to court
and obtain a remedy.41
This analysis is not merely theoretical. In the nineteenth
century, nineteen states and two territories issued state debt,
mainly to foreign residents. No fewer than nine of them (Arkansas,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Pennsylvania, and Florida) defaulted or repudiated their debts, but
courts, state and federal, were unwilling to enforce creditors’
rights.42 Although some of those states eventually decided to pay
their creditors, in no case was payment required by a court order.43
From a strict legal perspective, the creditors had no way to compel
the states to pay. Perhaps the most telling case was Louisiana’s debt
issuance from 1874.44 Louisiana’s bond issuance was conducted
pursuant to a state act that assured the state’s debt repayment.45 It
was also followed by a state constitutional amendment, providing
that the issued debt would by no means be impaired. Alas, six years
after the bond issuance, the state could not pay the interest on the
bonds and needed to default. To avoid being sued for breach of
contract and for failing to abide by its own constitution, Louisiana
again amended the constitution. The new constitution contained a
“debt ordinance” that stated that the coupon (the interest) due in
January 1880 was remitted, and that the creditors will not get paid.
Refusing to accept their loss, the bondholders turned to court for

40. See id.
41. See Gelpern supra note 20, at 898 (“U.S. states generally enjoy robust immunity
from lawsuits for money damages, and they cannot be sued for defaulting on debts without
their consent in the United States.”); Johnson & Young, supra note 20, at 150 (stating that
“state sovereign immunity poses a formidable bar to recovery on debt contracts by private
plaintiffs”); Gillette, supra note 20, at 1132 (“The state can simply refuse to pay those
obligations for which it has not waived sovereign immunity.”).
42. William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State
Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259 (1996).
43. Id. at 263–67.
44. State of Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
45. Under the act, state officials (including judges, tax collectors, and any other officer
of the state) would be guilty of a misdemeanor if they obstructed in any way the payment of
the bond. See id. at 714.
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assistance,46 but the court refused to help. The Supreme Court
determined that there was “no way in which the state, in its
capacity as an organized political community, can be brought
before any court of the state, or of the United States, to answer a
suit in the name of these holders to obtain such a judgment.”47 This
ruling was broadened in later cases48 and was again confirmed by
the Supreme Court in the 1990s.49 The ruling clarifies that, unlike
individuals and corporations, states do not need a bankruptcy
scheme to decrease their debt overhang. They can just stop paying
their debts, or statutorily eliminate them, and their creditors will
have no legal recourse against them.
If state bankruptcy law is not needed to allow states to reduce
states’ debt overhang, perhaps, similar to the municipal bankruptcy
chapter, it is required to facilitate debt reorganizations.50 Without
bankruptcy, when a distressed state wishes to obtain approval of a
debt readjustment agreement, the consent of a large majority of its
creditors, sometimes all of them, is required.51 This requirement is
likely to thwart efficient debt readjustments because minority
creditors are able to strategically extract rent from majority
creditors or the state. The minority knows its approval is required
for debt readjustment and can threaten to withhold consent if its

46. The creditors first turned to a state court, and then, following dismissal, sought
the help of the Supreme Court.
47. Elliott, 107 U.S. at 720.
48. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Hans Court broadened the state’s
immunity to lawsuits brought by the state’s own residents.
49. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (“Rather, as the Constitution’s
structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the
States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . .”). The
case of Hubbell v. Leonard, 6 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Ark. 1934), remains the exception to the rule.
In Hubbell, the district court enjoined the diversion of proceeds pledged for payment of state
bonds, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. The court determined that the suit, which
was directed against the state treasurer, was not one against the state, and it disqualified the
legislative acts that purported to divert funds from the bondholders to other state purposes
as unconstitutional. See id. It is highly doubtful, though, whether Hubbell would survive the
later more expansive interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, and it is not entirely clear
that the case was correctly decided even given the law in 1934. See Gillette, supra note 28, at
112–13; Gelpern, supra note 20, at 898 n.29.
50. See Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 327.
51. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Global Decentralization and the Subnational Debt Problem, 51
DUKE L.J. 1179, 1219 (2002).
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demands are not met (“the holdout problem”).52 A state bankruptcy
chapter might, therefore, be required to prevent holdouts.53 State
bankruptcy would set more flexible approval requirements for debt
readjustment agreements and would enable states to overcome
strategic minority objections.54
Although the holdout problem was in fact the reason for the
enactment of the municipal bankruptcy chapter,55 the same
rationale does not apply to states. In the case of municipalities (as
with individuals and corporations), bondholders who are not part
of the debt readjustment agreement can sue the municipality to get
their loan paid. The minority can hold out until the municipality
recovers and then, not bound by the debt readjustment, enforce the
original debt agreement. The same is not true for creditors of states.
As explained earlier,56 state bondholders cannot sue the state and
recover the unpaid debt. The state can decide not to pay any entity
that has not joined the debt readjustment agreement, and the
unpaid creditors have no legal recourse. Since creditors know the
courts will not assist them to enforce debts, they have a significant
52. In game theory, this type of situation is usually depicted as a “chicken game”—a
game of “who breaks down first?” A debt-readjustment agreement is beneficial to all parties
involved when compared to the current situation (no payment at all). However, for the
minority, it is even better to try to hold out and get better terms (perhaps payment at par).
As long as neither the majority nor the minority cave in, then all parties lose because there is
no payment at all. The minority, however, hopes the majority will concede (“play chicken”)
and give it what it wants. See ANDREW M. COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN
THE SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 111–12 (2d ed. 1995).
53. See Schwarcz, supra note 20.
54. Under chapter 9, the municipal bankruptcy chapter, the municipality can confirm
a debt-readjustment plan under the same majority standards set out in chapter 11. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129; see Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27
YALE J. ON REGUL. 351, 357–58 (2010). Since the bankruptcy code requires only a majority
approval and not unanimous or even close-to-unanimous consent, minority creditors cannot
hold out.
55. See Kimhi, supra note 54. During the Great Depression, many municipalities
unsuccessfully attempted to reach debt readjustment agreements with their creditors. The
negotiated agreements were not approved because of the strategic resistance of a small
minority, who demanded to be paid in full. Municipalities and majority creditors refused to
accept the minorities’ opportunistic behavior, and this resulted in a lockdown from which
no one benefited. See Amendment of Bankruptcy Laws—Bankruptcy of Municipalities: Hearing on
S. 1868 and H.R. 5950 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
46 (1934) (statement of David M. Wood). To find a way out of this lockdown, Congress
enacted chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code. Chapter 9 allows municipalities to file for
bankruptcy and under certain conditions to approve (or cram down) beneficial debt
readjustment agreements notwithstanding the minority’s dissent.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 37–49.
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incentive to reach an agreement with the state. They prefer the state
to voluntarily pay them because without the state’s good will, they
may not get paid at all.57
B. The Costs of Bankruptcy and Default
It seems, therefore, that the prevailing rationales for individual,
corporate, and municipal bankruptcy laws do little to justify the
adoption of state bankruptcy. This is because, unlike other types of
debtors, states can default with no legal repercussions. Their assets
are protected in any event, and they are immune from creditors’
litigation. But although a state can default or repudiate, whether in
or outside a bankruptcy process, without its creditors having legal
remedies, defaults are hardly a solution to a state’s economic crisis.
A default can create significant nonlegal costs that may severely
harm the defaulting state in the long run.
Perhaps the most important nonlegal cost associated with
default is a reputation cost.58 Economists have long emphasized the
role of reputation in the debt markets,59 showing that the
development of a repayment reputation enables creditors to
distinguish between good and bad debtors.60 When debtors are
57. The potential of states’ sovereign immunity to incentivize creditors to enter into a
debt readjustment agreement was demonstrated in the sovereign bond restructuring of the
late 1990s (the cases of Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, and Ecuador). See Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon
& Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Problem That Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt
Restructurings, 64 IMF ECON. REV. 471 (2016). Anna Gelpern explained that the relative
success of these debt readjustments were, at least in part, a result of the issuers’ sovereign
immunity, which is even narrower than the immunity states receive in the United States. See
Gelpern supra note 20, at 905.
58. Economic and public policy literature defines “reputation” as a “set of beliefs that
observers hold, or judgments that observers make, about an individual or an organization.”
See Kristina Daugirdas, Reputation as a Disciplinarian of International Organizations, 113 AM. J.
INT’L L. 221, 225 (2019); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance,
and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 98 (2002). Individuals and organizations wish
to uphold their reputation, that is, strengthen the set of positive believes that others have
about them, to make future cooperation possible. Karthik Panchanathan & Robert Boyd,
Indirect Reciprocity Can Stabilize Cooperation Without the Second-Order Free Rider Problem, 432
NATURE 499 (2004).
59. See generally Kent Walker, A Systematic Review of the Corporate Reputation Literature:
Deﬁnition, Measurement, and Theory, 12 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 357 (2010); Judith van Erp,
Reputational Sanctions in Private and Public Regulation, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 145 (2008).
60. See Douglas W. Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON.
828 (1989) (developing an economic model demonstrating the efficiency of reputation
acquisition in the debt markets). According to Diamond’s model, in a world without
reputation, debt markets are characterized by imperfect debtor-specific information.
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known to pay their debts, creditors perceive the risks associated
with extending them credit as being lower. As a corollary, creditors
can charge them lower interest rates, and in the long run good
debtors profit from paying their debts. Correspondingly, when
debtors default, creditors reappraise the risk premium associated
with extending them credit. Due to the increased risk, creditors
may either refuse to lend them altogether or increase the price of
lending, thereby impairing the debtors’ ability to borrow. Thus,
despite the short-term gains from default, in the long run,
tarnishing their reputation for debt repayment will harm the
defaulting debtors’ ability to consume and invest.61 The importance
of reputation increases when the legal system fails to provide
creditors with remedies to enforce payment (as is the case when a
state is the debtor).62 With no legal sanctions, there is a greater
incentive to default, so creditors prefer to loan to debtors they
perceive as reliable (not likely to default).63
Without such information, creditors lump all debtors together and charge them all the same
average interest rates (that reflect all debtors’ average rates of return). This amalgamation
harms good debtors (debtors that are well managed and invest in safe projects). Good
debtors pay higher interest rates than their true risk premium requires because, without
debtor-specific information, the creditors don’t distinguish between them and the reckless
borrowers. Good borrowers, therefore, have an interest in developing a reputation for
payment discipline and signaling to creditors just how reliable they are.
61. Id. at 840–41.
62. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV.
373 (1990).
63. The sovereign debt market, in which no legal sanctions can be imposed on
defaulting debtors, demonstrates this point. In this market, the need to maintain a reputation
as a good debtor is crucial, and the reputational sanctions imposed on defaulting debtors are
severe. See Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and
Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651, 652–59 (2009). Empirically
examining the sovereign debt market, scholars have documented various costs that
sovereign debtors have incurred as a result of default. One type of cost is total exclusion from
the debt markets for a certain period of time. This was the case especially with respect to
African and Middle Eastern economies and small economies. See CHRISTINE RICHMOND &
DANIEL A. DIAS, DURATION OF CAPITAL MARKET EXCLUSION: STYLIZED FACTS AND
DETERMINING FACTORS (2009); R. Gaston Gelos, Ratna Sahay & Guido Sandleris, Sovereign
Borrowing by Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access? (IMF Working Paper No.
WP/04/221, 2004). In other cases, there was an increase in interest rates. Interest rates soared
by no fewer than 250 to 400 basis points after a default, but the length of such increase is
undetermined. See Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default 56 (IMF
Working Paper No. WP/08/238, 2008) [hereinafter Borensztein & Panizza, The Costs of
Sovereign Default]; Sule Özler, Have Commercial Banks Ignored History?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 608,
608–20 (1993). Third, and perhaps most significantly, there were trade sanctions after the
default. Since trade often requires faith in the trading counterparty, defaulting sovereigns
see a sharp decline in trade volume. See KALETSKY ANATOLE, THE COSTS OF DEFAULT 36–38
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Reputation costs are therefore likely to be severe in the case of
sub-sovereign (state) default. Since the beginning of the twentieth
century, only one state in the United States (Arkansas) has
defaulted,64 but in the nineteenth century, states paid dearly for not
fulfilling their financial obligations.65 William English examined
the state debt market in the 1840s, and he showed that reputation
costs incurred by defaulting states were significant. He explained
that whereas states that paid their debts in full in the early 1840s
were able to borrow in large amounts throughout the 1840s and
1850s. Yet states that repudiated their debts, such as Florida and
Mississippi, had difficulties accessing the debt market and were
unable to borrow significant amounts as late as the 1860s (after the
Civil War).66 Even states that resumed payments a few years after
the default suffered reputation costs. Their reputation was already
tarnished, and the yields on their bonds were relatively high.67
Hence, if the purpose of default (whether in or outside bankruptcy)
is to provide debt relief and a fresh start, default may be selfdefeating because of the reputation costs associated with it. The

(1985); Andrew K. Rose, One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International
Trade, 77 J. DEV. ECON. 189 (2005); Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, Do Sovereign Defaults
Hurt Exporters?, 21 OPEN ECON. REV. 393 (2010). Last, a default can also affect domestic
output. Due to the default, residents have less trust in the domestic economy, and foreign
investors tend to invest less. See Miguel Fuentes & Diego Saravia, Sovereign Defaulters: Do
International Capital Markets Punish Them?, 91 J. DEV. ECON. 336 (2010); Carlos Arteta & Galina
Hale, Sovereign Debt Crises and Credit to the Private Sector, 74 J. INT’L ECON. 53 (2008). All these
costs, certainly when combined, adversely affect the sovereign’s economy at a time when it
is especially vulnerable, and they render the benefits from a potential default, even when
the default is unsanctionable from a strict legal perspective, questionable. Some scholars
argue that reputation is the main reason that, despite the lack of legal sanctions, sovereign
debtors seldom default and the sovereign debt market functions relatively smoothly. See
Borensztein & Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default, supra at 683 (“There is broad consensus
in the economic literature that the presence of costly sovereign defaults is the mechanism
that makes sovereign debt possible.”); Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, Sovereign
Debt 3–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 5131, 1995),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w5131.pdf.
64. See O. Emre Ergungor, Commentary, When States Default: Lessons from Law and
History, ECON. COMMENT. (2017). Note that in the case of Arkansas’s default, the federal
district court accepted the creditors’ suit notwithstanding the state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See supra note 49. Reputation costs in this case, therefore, have been mitigated.
65. See generally English, supra note 42.
66. Id. at 268–69.
67. Pennsylvania, for example, continued payments on its bond in 1845, but yields on
its state bonds were four percent higher than yields on treasury bonds for several years after
the repayment. Id. at 269.
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state will be able to relieve itself of past obligations, but it will have
difficulties taking on new debt, which is necessary for its continued
operations. There will be, instead of a fresh start, lack of investment
and stagnation.
Note also that the defaulting state may not be the only entity
that suffers from the default. Cessation of payments by a state can
adversely affect other parties—in particular, other states and the
federal government (“contagion effects”).68 Contagion effects result
from, among other things, the information that the event of default
transfers to the debt markets. If an entity with certain characteristics
fails to pay its debts, other entities with similar relevant
characteristics may end up also not paying their debts, and the
default alerts the markets to the risks associated with lending.69
Such contagion effects were found after all three major municipal

68. The literature divides contagion effects into three types: common shock,
counterparty contagion, and information contagion. See Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note
20, at 718; Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 455 (2011). The first type of
contagion, common shock, involves an exogenous event that causes a simultaneous failure
to firms from a certain sector. COVID-19 is perhaps the most obvious example, but there
have been many other examples throughout history, such as the events of September 11, the
World Wars, and large earthquakes. Id. at 460–61. The second type, counterparty contagion,
occurs when the failure of one firm leads to the failure of its counterparties—customers,
suppliers, creditors, and so on. The debtor does not meet its obligations to its counterparties,
and, as a result, its counterparties have difficulties themselves. Customers do not receive
supplies essential to their production lines, creditors are not paid what they are owed, and
suppliers lose the debtor as client. The risk of a broad counterparty contagion as a result of a
state default, however, is not very large. Since states continue to operate, employ, and
consume, many employees and suppliers will most likely be able to keep their positions even
amid default. The risk to bondholders is also not very high because bondholders (mostly
mutual funds, money market funds, and households) tend to diversify their portfolios and
are not likely to collapse due to one state’s default. See Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note
20, at 722–26; STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41735, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DEBT: AN ANALYSIS 1 (2011), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41735.pdf. The Article, thus,
focuses on the third type of contagion, information contagion.
69. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 20, at 717–22; Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal
Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 302–
08 (2012). Gillette explained that when the market is able to distinguish between the
defaulting debtor and other entities, contagion effects should not occur. But since markets
are not always able to make such distinctions, especially with regard to public debt, which
requires relatively low levels of disclosure, contagion effects do materialize. Id. at 303.
Information contagion can be thought of as a crisis of confidence. The default shakes the
market’s confidence not only with respect to the defaulting entity, but also with respect to
other comparable debtors, and the erosion in market confidence leads to higher prices of
credit. See Levitin, supra note 68, at 458–60.
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bankruptcy events—Orange County, California; Detroit, Michigan;
and Jefferson County, Alabama.70
The contagion of a state default is likely to be even greater than
that of a municipality. First, since most states are larger than most
municipalities, the ripples that their default would send through
the markets would probably be stronger.71 The sheer size of most
states’ economies would render the implications of their default
more severe, and therefore the erosion in market confidence more
significant.72 Second, as opposed to municipal defaults which are
familiar, albeit uncommon, events, state defaults have not occurred
for almost a century (since Arkansas in 1933). A state default,
therefore, would probably be a wake-up call to the market that
would transmit the novel information that states are also prone to
default, which might result in a major price increase in states’ debt
in general.73 Third, as discussed earlier, creditors of a state, as
70. Halstead and others measured the spillover effects from the Orange County
default. They showed that the value of non–Orange County bonds dropped, on average, by
2.67% immediately after the announcement of the bankruptcy (after controlling for other
possible explanatory variables) and that counties that, like Orange County, were exposed to
the derivative markets suffered the most. The research, however, does not indicate the length
of the contagion effect of the Orange County default. See John M. Halstead, Shantaram Hegde
& Linda Schmid Klein, Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond
and Bank Equity Markets, 39 FIN. REV. 293 (2004). Nikolay Gospodinov and others followed
the events of Detroit’s bankruptcy from May 2013 until June 2014. They found that Detroit’s
default had little effect on the municipal bond market in most states, but it had a significant
effect in Michigan as well as in Illinois and Puerto Rico. Illinois and Puerto Rico, like
Michigan, suffered from heavy financial and pension obligations, and the resemblance in
debtor characteristics caused the markets to reappraise the risks associated with their debts
as well. See Nikolay Gospodinov, Brian Robertson & Paula Tkac, Do Municipal Bonds Pose a
Systemic Risk? Evidence from the Detroit Bankruptcy, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ATLANTA (Dec. 29,
2014), https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/conference/PDF/tkac.pdf. Kate
Yang studied the bankruptcy of Jefferson County in Alabama. Unlike Halstead and others,
she did not find contagion effects associated with geographical proximity; rather, the effects
were connected to borrower and debt characteristics. Contagion effects, in her study, were
measured with respect to general purpose municipalities (as opposed to special purpose
districts) and with respect to general obligation bonds (as opposed to revenue bonds). See
Lang (Kate) Yang, Negative Externality of Fiscal Problems: Dissecting the Contagion Effect of
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 156 (2019).
71. For the effect of the size of an economy in sovereign default, see Jiali Fang & Yafeng
Qin, Trade Link, Neighbourhood and Country Size: Which Is More Important in Driving
Contagion?, 2 INT’L J. ADVANCES IN MGMT. SCI. 92, 92–102 (2013).
72. Compare, with respect to counterparty contagion, Li-Chiu Chi, Inter-Industry
Financial Contagion and Reorganization Filings, 33 CHIAO DA MGMT. REV. 37, 55 (2013).
73. In the sovereign bonds markets, this phenomenon is referred to as the wake-up
call hypothesis. A default event serves as a wake-up call for investors, after which they
understand they need to reappraise and more closely monitor the market of segments

889

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:3 (2022)

opposed to those of a municipality, do not have legal recourse
against their debtor. When lending to a state, creditors rely mostly
on the state’s reputation for repayment, and with no legal recourse,
default may result in lower rates of returns. The low rates of return
increase the risk of debt, and the increased risk will probably lead
to stronger contagion effects.74 And indeed, states’ defaults in the
1840s had severe negative effects, not only on the states themselves
but also on the federal government.75
II. WHY FEDERAL ASSISTANCE TO DISTRESSED STATES IS NECESSARY
The foregoing analysis explained why, from the states’
perspective, bankruptcy is not a good idea. First, bankruptcy is not
required because the law already protects states and their assets
from their creditors. Second, it may be associated with reputation
costs that could harm the defaulting state in the long run. The
analysis may also begin to explain why, from the federal
government’s perspective, intervention to prevent state default
may be beneficial. The federal government may be concerned about
contagion effects, and it may prefer to bail out states rather than
bear the costs associated with a state’s default.76
thereof. See Raffaela Giordano, Marcello Pericoli & Pietro Tommasino, Pure or Wake‐Up‐Call
Contagion? Another Look at the EMU Sovereign Debt Crisis, 16 INT’L FIN. 131 (2013); DILIP K.
DAS, THE ANATOMY OF A CRISIS: ASIA AS GROUND ZERO (2005).
74. The lack of enforcement measures also impacts contagion effects in sovereign
bonds. See JungJae Park, Contagion of Sovereign Default Risk: The Role of Two Financial Frictions,
MPRA (Jan. 2, 2013), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55197/.
75. These effects were felt in 1842 when the federal government explored the
possibility of issuing sovereign bonds in Europe and was given a cold shoulder. European
investors told U.S. agents they would not buy U.S. bonds because they feared the federal
government, like state governments, would default. Although only some of the states
defaulted and many of them later resumed payment, the federal government paid a price.
English, supra note 42, at 270 (citing REGINALD C. MCGRANE, FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS AND
AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 33–34 (1935)).
76. The fear of contagion in and of itself, though, should not necessarily justify a
federal bailout. On the contrary, when bailouts are conducted only because of the fear of
contagion, they are likely to create strategic behavior on the part of the states. Clayton Gillette
warned that these contagion costs allow municipalities to strategically use municipal
bankruptcy to force states to bail them out. Municipalities can squander funds and behave
in a fiscally irresponsible manner because they can expect the state government to bail them
out due to the fear of contagion. See Gillette, supra note 69, at 319. The same argument can
made with respect to states’ default. See id. at 328. A state may overspend because it knows
the federal government will bail it out because of its fear of contagion. See Gerard N.
Magliocca, “Too Big to Fail” States, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1089 (2011). I address this moral hazard
argument later in the Article when I discuss the dangers of federal bailouts.
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However, the need for federal assistance goes much deeper
than the concern about contagion. The federal government has an
interest, perhaps an obligation to assist states, primarily because
states’ fiscal crises are often caused by factors over which the states
have little control (sometimes by the federal government’s
policies). These crises should be dealt with using tools only the
federal government possesses and that the states cannot
independently implement. If the federal government does not use
these tools, and if it fails to assist distressed states, the economic
crisis will be prolonged, and both the states and the federal
government will suffer.
In this Part, I examine this argument. First, I look at the causes
of state fiscal crises and at the tools needed to deal with them. Then
I show the advantages to the federal government addressing at
least some of the crises.
A. The Reasons for States’ Fiscal Distress—A Taxonomy
The reasons states go broke vary.77 States’ economies are large
and complicated, and it is difficult to pinpoint a single factor that is
responsible for states’ fiscal difficulties.78 Following the economic
literature on this subject, however, it is convenient to differentiate
between two types of reasons for states’ economic decline: reasons
connected to political agency and reasons connected to the national
economy and fiscal federalism.79 Although crises are usually the
result of both types of reasons, in each crisis scholars tend to
emphasize one category of reasons over the other.
The first category of reasons—political agency problems—
connects to a wide range of literature on public choice theory.80

77. Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1399, 1406–28 (2012); see also STEVEN D. GOLD, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATES: LESSONS FOR
THE FUTURE 6 (1995) (differentiating between reasons under the state’s control and reasons
beyond the state’s control).
78. The reasons diverge not only among crises of different states, but also among
different crises a single state experiences over time. See Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & John
Joseph Wallis, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Crises, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE 9 (Peter ContiBrown & David Skeel eds., 2012).
79. GOLD, supra note 77.
80. See Levitin, supra note 77, at 1420–28; Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 20, at
690. With respect to public choice theory, see generally William F. Shughart II, Public Choice,
LIBR. ECONS. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html (last
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According to public choice theory, politicians can be perceived
as homines economici, who, rather than serve the public altruistically,
aim to self-interestedly increase their own political power and
control.81 They unnecessarily spend public funds to gain
popularity, succumb to the financial demands of interest groups to
win political support, and manipulate the budget to comply with
the demands of their constituencies.82 As a result of these agency
problems, when state politicians find it worthwhile, and when the
state’s political environment and procedures permit,83 politicians
overspend the state’s scarce resources and push the state toward
financial calamity. They strategically create deficits, they take on
too much debt, and they manipulate budgetary rules, causing
severe economic damage.84 Edwards and others, for example, argue
that states’ overspending due to political agency was the key reason
for the financial crisis states suffered after the burst of the dot-com
bubble.85 The 1990s brought a significant surge in state revenues,
but state politicians recklessly spent the excess revenues instead of
saving for a rainy day. Stansel and Mitchell reach a similar

visited Nov. 16, 2021) for a detailed discussion of public choice theory and the foundational
principles behind it.
81. Jean Tirole, The Internal Organization of Government, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
1 (1994); Robert J. Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, 14 PUB. CHOICE 19,
26–32 (1973).
82. See Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice, 65 CHI.KENT L. REV. 161 (1989); Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L. Rev. 959, 962–63 (1991).
83. The literature regarding both local and national governments emphasizes the role
of fragmented political environments in the creation of budget deficits. See Omer Kimhi,
Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 643–47 (2008).
84. Levitin, supra note 77, at 1420–28. Political agency explains various types of state
behaviors that can cause budget deficits. Adam Levitin emphasized several of these
explanations, such as common pool problems or political fragmentation (politicians promote
spending that benefits their constituency even when it increases a deficit detrimental to
the public as a whole), see id. at 1421; strategic deficits (politicians use debt or run a deficit
to limit a future government’s policies), id. at 1422; intergenerational redistribution (the
present generation spends but future generations pay the debts), id. at 1423; opportunistic
exploiting of voters’ fiscal illusion to get elected (voters overvalue current expenditures
and misunderstand that current expenditures translate to higher taxes in the future), id. at
1424–25; and more.
85. See Chris Edwards, Stephen Moore & Phil Kerpen, States Face Fiscal Crunch After
1990s Spending Surge, CATO INST. (Feb. 12, 2003), https://www.cato.org/briefingpaper/states-face-fiscal-crunch-after-1990s-spending-surge.
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conclusion.86 They look at the average annual increase in general
fund spending in different states over the period 1991–2001 and
show that it is significantly correlated with states’ fiscal stress
between 2001 and 2003.87
A common example of states’ political agency problems
concerns public pensions.88 State pension funds are considered one
of the greatest threats to states’ fiscal stability because they incur
deficits that states will eventually have to cover.89 According to one
estimate, in 2009, pensions were underfunded by more than $3
trillion—approximately triple the amount of states’ public debt
obligations.90 The reason states’ pension obligations are such a
burdensome problem is that state politicians self-interestedly
comply with public unions’ compensation claims. They need the
unions’ support for their election, so they agree to union demands
even when the state does not have sufficient funds to finance
them.91 This creates a ticking fiscal time bomb that politicians,
assuming (or hoping) it will not explode while they are in office,
continuously fuel.92 Due to these political agency problems, Illinois,
for example, will have to contribute 16% of its budget in 2030 just
to cover its pension obligations.93
The importance of political agency problems notwithstanding,
many state fiscal woes are related to forces beyond the states’
control, namely national economic cycles and fiscal federalism.94
86. See Dean Stansel & David T. Mitchell, State Fiscal Crises: Are Rapid Spending
Increases to Blame?, 28 CATO J. 435 (2008).
87. See id.
88. Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Pension Pressures in the United States, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE 57, 60–62 (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012). David Skeel referred to
pension liabilities as “the single greatest threat to states’ fiscal stability.” Skeel, States of
Bankruptcy, supra note 20, at 691.
89. See Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, supra note 20, at 691.
90. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored
Pension Plans, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 191, 192 (2009); Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis,
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 11 (2013); Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry & Laura Quinby,
The Impact of Public Pensions on State and Local Budgets, CTR. RET. RSCH. (Oct. 2010),
https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/slp_13-508.pdf.
91. As the head of New York’s sanitation union said, “We have a natural advantage
that no [private-sector] union has. We elect our employers.” Pietro S. Nivola, Apocalypse
Now? Whither the Urban Fiscal Crisis, 14 POLITY 371, 376 (1982).
92. See Richard A. Epstein, The Wisconsin Shoot Out on Public Unions, HOOVER INST.
(Feb. 22, 2011), https://www.hoover.org/research/wisconsin-shoot-out-public-unions.
93. Munnell, Aubry & Quinby, supra note 90, at 5–6.
94. GOLD, supra note 77, at 6.
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States’ revenues decrease as a result of a national recession, while
their expenditures increase due to fiscal federal policies. This
incompatibility creates budgetary pressures and pushes states to
fiscal crises.95
States’ revenues can be divided into two main sources—
revenues from intergovernmental transfers (which make up, on
average, approximately 33% of revenues) and revenues from the
state’s own independent sources, namely taxes, charges, and fees
collected from their residents (which make up approximately 67%
of revenues).96 Of the independent revenues, three types of taxes—
sales taxes, individual income taxes, and corporate income taxes—
are the most important sources of revenue.97 They constitute, on
average, approximately 43% of states’ revenues (including the
intergovernmental transfers), and, unlike many federal grants, they
can be used to finance all state expenditures.98 Unfortunately, these
three taxes are very sensitive to national economic cycles. They are
“procyclical,” which means that when recession strikes, state
revenues drop.99 During recessions, unemployment usually rises
and state income tax collection decreases.100 High unemployment,
uncertainty, and falling private wealth (mostly due to the decline
of real estate prices)101 slows down business activity, and proceeds

95. Mansoor Dailami, Time for a New Fiscal Federalism: Three Reforms Deserve Attention,
INT’L ECON. 42 (2020).
96. The Tax Policy Center’s Briefing Book, What Are the Sources of Revenue for
States Governments?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/
what-are-sources-revenue-state-governments (last visited Nov. 16, 2021) [hereinafter Tax
Policy Center].
97. See id.; see also Howard Chernick, Cordelia Reimers & Jennifer Tennant, Tax
Structure and Revenue Instability: The Great Recession and the States, 3 IZA J. LAB. POL’Y 1 (2014);
Richard F. Dye, State Revenue Cyclicality, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 133, 138 (2004).
98. Tax Policy Center, supra note 96.
99. See GOLD, supra note 77, at 6–8.
100. See Elizabeth McNichol & Nicholas Johnson, Recession Continues to Batter State
Budgets; State Responses Could Slow Recovery, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 4 (Jan. 2010),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265082535_Recession_Continues_to_Batter_St
ate_Budgets_State_Responses_could_Slow_Recovery (predicting that high unemployment
combined with lower income tax revenues would lead to weak fiscal prospects for states
during their recovery from the 2008 recession).
101. See ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED
THE GREAT RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 17–19,
31–33 (2014).
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from sales taxes decrease as well.102 Thus, although states cannot be
blamed for a national economic downward cycle, their revenues
significantly suffer from one.
Robert Inman studied states’ finances in the Great Recession,
examining whether their financial distress was a result of the
national economy or their own problematic fiscal policies.103 His
analysis revealed that the most important and significant factor is
the state’s unemployment rate. Whereas states’ political
characteristics and prerecession budgetary policies made little
difference (if any at all), a relatively small increase in the state’s
unemployment rate (from 6% to 10%) raised the deficit on average
by $222 per person in the state.104 Liz McNichol reached similar
conclusions with respect to the state crisis at the beginning of the
millennium.105 Unlike Stansel and Mitchell,106 she argued that states
did not overspend in the 1990s and that the crisis was the result of
decreased revenues due to the recession. According to her
calculations, revenues for the second quarter of fiscal year 2002
were about 13% below their level in the same quarter of 2001 and
reflected twice the reduction experienced by states in the recession
of the early 1990s. States had difficulties coping with such a steep
reduction, and they suffered distress.107
But despite procyclical revenues, in the division of
responsibilities between the states and the federal government,
states carry a significant share of countercyclical expenditures (i.e.,
expenditures that surge when the economy contracts).108 In times of
102. William F. Fox & Charles Campbell, Stability of the State Sales Tax Income Elasticity,
37 NAT’L TAX J. 201, 203–05 (1984).
103. Robert P. Inman, States in Fiscal Distress 13–19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 16086, 2010), https://www.nber.org/papers/w16086.
104. Id. at 17. Chernick, Reimers, and Tennant also looked at states’ fiscal policies in the
Great Recession, and they examined whether altering the states’ tax composition (shifting
the emphasis from income taxes to consumption taxes) could better the states’ fiscal
conditions. Their answer was in the negative. They showed the shocks to states’ tax revenues
were not caused by reliance on one type of tax or another but rather by changes in the
national economy. See Chernick et al., supra note 97, at 16–18.
105. Liz McNichol, The State Fiscal Crisis: Extent, Causes, and Responses, CTR. ON BUDGET
& POL’Y PRIORITIES 1, 15 (Apr. 24, 2003), https://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/4-24-03sfp.pdf.
106. Stansel & Mitchell, supra note 86, at 436–37 (arguing that states’ rapid spending
growth led to states’ fiscal crisis).
107. McNichol, supra note 105, at 10.
108. Damon A. Silvers, Obligations Without the Power to Fund Them, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE 40, 40–41 (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012).
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downturn, the demand for many of the services states provide
(pursuant to federal policies) increases, and the states do not have
sufficient revenue to finance the increased demand.109 Medicaid is
a good example. The Medicaid program was established in 1965 by
President Johnson to provide healthcare for the poor.110 The
program is jointly financed by federal and state governments such
that every amount spent by the state is matched by a certain
amount spent by the federal government.111 The share of Medicaid
expenses financed by each state is determined according to a
formula based on the per-capita revenue in the state, but on average
states pay approximately 40% of Medicaid expenses.112 This creates a
huge burden on state finances in times of recession. When recession
strikes, more people are eligible to enroll in Medicaid, and the states’
costs increase accordingly.113 In the Great Recession, for example,
between 2008 and 2012 there was approximately 28% increase in
109. Id. at 40 (“States have not generally had the authority to borrow to fund operating
expenses since the Civil War. However, since the Great Depression, states have had partial
responsibility for large-scale countercyclical spending through the unemployment insurance
system and the Medicaid system.”).
110. For a general description of the program, see Jonathan Gruber, Medicaid, in
MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2003),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c10254/c10254.pdf.
111. Samantha Artiga, Elizabeth Hinton, Robin Rudowitz & MaryBeth Musumeci,
Current Flexibility in Medicaid: An Overview of Federal Standards and State Options, HENRY J.
KAISER
FAM.
FOUND.
1
(2017),
https://nationaldisabilitynavigator.org/wpcontent/uploads/news-items/KFF_Current-Flexibility-in-Medicaid_Jan-2017.pdf; Jeffrey
Clemens & Benedic Ippolito, Implications of Medicaid Financing Reform for State Government
Budgets, 32 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 135, 136 (2018). The formula of the federal match rate, known
as the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), combines the state’s income per capita
and the national average. It therefore differs from state to state, varying from 50% to 83%. In
addition to the state variation, the match may also change among protected groups: children,
adults, etc. See id. Although traditionally the federal matching grant was limitless, a reform
initiated by the Trump administration in 2020 allows states to convert healthcare financing
into block grants (as opposed to open-ended matching grants), thereby cutting the benefits
provided to certain adults and capping the federal assistance given to the states. As shall be
elaborated on later, this reform may aggravate states’ fiscal situation in times of recession.
Jessica Schubel, Hannah Katch, Judith Solomon & Aviva Aron-Dine, The Trump
Administration’s Medicaid Block Grant Guidance: Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES 8 (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
2-6-20health_0.pdf.
112. Andy Schneider, Medicaid and State Budgets: Checking the Facts (Yet Again), GEO. U.
HEALTH POL’Y INST. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2019/02/28/medicaidand-state-budgets-checking-the-facts-yet-again/; Medicaid—CBO’s April 2018 Baseline,
CONG. BUDGET OFF. 1, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2018-06/51301-2018-04medicaid.pdf.
113. Silvers, supra note 108, at 49–50.
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Medicaid enrollment, and in 2011 alone, states’ Medicaid expenses
surged by 7.3% on average (across all states).114 Unsurprisingly,
states had difficulties sustaining the added expense, especially when
their revenues were falling. Another example is unemployment.
The unemployment insurance program was established in 1935 to
provide temporary partial wage replacement for unemployed
persons. Unemployment payments are financed through a payroll
tax levied against employers by both the federal government
(FUTA) and the state government (SUTA).115 In principle, the
collected tax should cover unemployment benefits, with any
surplus transferred to the state’s unemployment trust fund.116 In
times of recession, however, the number of unemployed persons
sharply increases, and often unemployment taxes, even together with
state unemployment trust funds, are insufficient to pay benefits.
The unemployment trust funds enter deficits, which the states are
responsible to cover.117 Due to the Great Recession, for example,
thirty-six state unemployment trust funds became insolvent, and
states had to borrow billions of dollars from the federal government
to cover the deficits and pay the unemployed.118
Examining the composition of states’ expenditures reveals that
a significant portion of their budgets is made up of these
countercyclical expenses. According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
in 2017, 51.8% of states’ expenditures were for health and
welfare, 21.4% were for education, and 6.6% were for public
safety.119 States do not control the demand for these services
(which surges in recessions), and they do not independently
determine the level of these services or their price. It is no wonder,
114. Vernon K. Smith, Kathleen Gifford, Eileen Ellis, Robin Rudowitz & Laura Snyder,
Moving Ahead Amid Fiscal Challenges: A Look at Medicaid Spending, Coverage and Policy
Trends, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED 1, 25–29 (Oct. 2011),
https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/8248.pdf.
115. Chad Stone & William Chen, Introduction to Unemployment Insurance, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1, 7–8 (July 30, 2014), https://www.cbpp.org/
sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-19-02ui.pdf. The federal government levies a six percent
tax on the first $7,000 paid annually to each employee and the state tax differs among states,
depending on unemployment benefits.
116. See Silvers, supra note 108, at 47–48.
117. See Wayne Vroman & Stephen A. Woodbury, Financing Unemployment Insurance,
67 NAT’L TAX J. 253, 253 (2014).
118. See id.
119. See State & Local Government Snapshot, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 24, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/interactive/state-local-snapshot.html.
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therefore, that recessions, which exogenously decrease states’
revenues while increasing their expenditures, have such a lethal
effect on states’ economies.
B. The Tools States Have to Address Fiscal Crises (or Lack Thereof)
The federal government also suffers from decreased revenues
and increased expenditures during recessions, often resulting in
huge deficits. The difference between the states and the federal
government in this respect is that the latter has various tools at its
disposal to address the recession. It has macroeconomic authorities;
it is legally allowed to manage a deficit budget; and it can borrow
relatively easily. The states, on the other hand, are forced to
implement austerity measures (in particular, cut costs and raise
taxes), and these measures, according to economic theory, worsen
the crisis rather than mitigate it.
Economic theory suggests that recessions and economic
downturns can be dealt with using two sets of tools: fiscal tools and
monetary tools.120 The former comprise government spending and
taxation. According to Keynesian theory, one of the dominant
theories in macroeconomics, when the economy suffers from a
recession, the government should implement expanding fiscal
policy.121 That is, the government should increase its spending in
the economy and perhaps also decrease taxation to encourage
growth, even at the price of budget deficits or increased
borrowing.122 By increasing spending, preferably through investing
in public projects (often labor intensive), the government not only
120. See Mark Horton & Asmaa El-Ganainy, Fiscal Policy: Taking and Giving Away, INT’L
MONETARY FUND (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/
fiscpol.htm; Sarwat Jahan & Chris Papageorgiou, Monetarism: Money Is Where It’s At, in BACK
TO BASICS: ECONOMIC CONCEPTS EXPLAINED 16, 17–18 (2017); Philip Rocco, Daniel Béland &
Alex Waddan, Stuck in Neutral? Federalism, Policy Instruments, and Counter-cyclical Responses
to COVID-19 in the United States, 39 POL’Y & SOC’Y 458, 460 (2020).
121. Sarwat Jahan, Ahmed Saber Mahmud & Chris Papageorgiou, What is Keynesian
Economics?, in BACK TO BASICS: ECONOMIC CONCEPTS EXPLAINED 4, 4–5 (2017).
122. Keynesian theory assumes that in times of recession, government investments, at
least in the short run, do not change market prices (and in the long run, as Keynes famously
said, we are all dead). “Sticky prices” allow the increase in demand for services (created by
the government) to change the output and the employment, and this facilitates growth and
recovery. See STEVEN A. GREENLAW & DAVID SHAPIRO, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS
298–310 (2d ed. 2018); Alan S. Blinder, Keynesian Economics, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2021); Jahan & Papageorgiou, supra note 120, at 4–5.
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directly adds to the nation’s economy, but also creates indirect
positive domino effects, which in economics are termed as
“multipliers.”123 The government’s investments are funneled to
public employees, contractors, or welfare recipients, who then have
more disposable income to spend on consumption. The increased
demand for consumption increases production, which in turn
increases employment, and so on. Due to this spending circle, each
dollar the government spends contributes to more than one dollar
in GDP growth. Not only does the government spend, but its
spending promotes spending by others.124
The second set of tools, monetary tools, controls the supply of
money in the economy using the market’s interest rate or by
injecting money into the markets (for example, by quantitative
easing).125 Increasing the amount of money that circles in the
economy promotes growth because the higher the amount of
money in the markets, the more the public spends (as opposed to
saves).126 For example, when the Fed lowers the interest rate, it
reduces people’s incentive to keep their money in the bank. The
saving opportunities are not as attractive (due to low interest rates),
so people tend to spend and consume more. Again, the increased
demand for consumption leads to increased production, which in
123. The multiplier measures by how much an increase in government spending or tax
cut increases output. If the government increases its spending by $100 billion and output
increases by $150 billion, then the multiplier is equal to 1.5. Generally, if the market realizes
its potential (there is growth and low unemployment), then the multiplier should be 0.
Government spending will increase output and only raise prices. However, when the market
is in recession, individuals are unemployed, and factories do not fully produce, the stimulus
is greater than 1. Government spending puts individuals and factories to work, the increased
consumption raises output, and both consumers and businesses spend more. This cascade of
spending stimulates growth and facilitates recovery. See Much Ado About Multipliers,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 26, 2009), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/
2009/09/24/much-ado-about-multipliers; Jahan & Papageorgiou, supra note 120, at 4;
Charles J. Whalen & Felix Reichling, The Fiscal Multiplier and Economic Policy Analysis in the
United States, 33 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 735, 735–44 (2015).
124. GREENLAW & SHAPIRO, supra note 122, at 302–05; Gerhard Illing & Sebastian
Watzka, Fiscal Multipliers and Their Relevance in a Currency Union—A Survey, 15 GERMAN
ECON. REV. 259, 260–62 (2013); Where Does the Buck Stop?, ECONOMIST (Aug. 13, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/schools-brief/2016/08/13/where-does-the-buck-stop.
125. See GREENLAW & SHAPIRO, supra note 122, at 355–70. Quantitative easing is the
action of buying securities, such as treasury bonds, with newly printed money. Although the
central bank does not physically print the money, it creates it anew with the press of a button.
R.A., What Is Quantitative Easing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.economist.com/
the-economist-explains/2015/03/09/what-is-quantitative-easing.
126. GREENLAW & SHAPIRO, supra note 122, at 362–65.
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turn increases employment, and so on.127 Although economists
often differ on which set of tools, fiscal or monetary, works best
and how exactly to use them, the federal government has both sets
at its disposal.128
States, on the other hand, do not have the tools to promote
recovery. They do not have any monetary tools and their fiscal tools
are extremely limited.129 First, the monetary authority to set interest
rates and the ability to increase the supply of money are vested
solely in the Fed. States do not determine a state-specific money
supply, and they cannot use monetary incentives, like interest rates,
to persuade residents to spend.130 They are subject to the national
supply of money, with no ability to adapt it to the specific needs of
the state. In addition, states cannot print money. If the federal
government faces an extraordinary need for spending that it cannot
finance through borrowing or taxes, the Fed has the authority to
create new money.131 Normally, printing money is frowned upon
because it is likely to cause inflation, but under extreme
circumstances the federal government can use this tool, while state
governments lack such authority.132 Second, states have limited
fiscal tools. Fiscal tools, as explained, require the state government
to spend money on the economy, but nearly all states (49 of them,
with Vermont being the exception) operate under balanced budget
constraints.133 Their revenues must be equal to their expenditures,
and, even if it would be beneficial to the economy, they cannot
operate under a deficit budget.134 When recession strikes, states’ tax
127. Id. at 365–75.
128. For a general overview of the development of economic thought, see TIM
CONGDON, KEYNES, THE KEYNESIANS AND MONETARISM 1–15 (2007).
129. Rocco et al., supra note 120, at 460–61.
130. Gelpern, supra note 20, at 916–17.
131. See Greg Hannsgen & Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, The Central Bank “Printing Press”:
Boon or Bane? Remedies for High Unemployment and Fears of Fiscal Crisis 3 (Levy Econ. Inst. of
Bard College, Working Paper No. 640, 2010), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/
10419/57002/1/64232588X.pdf.
132. During the Great Recession, the Fed, like many other central banks, performed
quantitative easing, which in essence is similar to printing money in order to buy securities.
See id.
133. NCSL FISCAL BRIEF, STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS, NAT’L CONF.
STATE
LEGISLATORS
2
(Oct.
2010),
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/
StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf.
134. Jeremy Gerst & Daniel Wilson, Fiscal Crises of the States: Causes and Consequences,
FRBSF ECON. LETTER, June 28, 2010, at 2; see also Henning Bohn & Robert P. Inman, Balanced-
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revenues shrink and they are unable to spend—certainly not to
implement an expansionary fiscal policy. In theory, like the federal
government, states can borrow to finance their expenses. States,
however, often have borrowing constraints. Many of them cannot
borrow at will, but rather are subject to certain burdensome
procedures such as referendum or supermajority requirements.135
When this is the case, states may have only their income to spend,
and when income declines, they sustain their spending.
Thus, without monetary or fiscal tools, when states face a
recession, the only policies they can implement are to raise taxes or
to cut their discretionary expenses (so they will uphold their legal
obligation to keep a balanced budget).136 However, these measures
only aggravate the economic downturn. Opposite of the suggested
Keynesian fiscal expansion, they shrink the economy and decrease
consumption.137 They not only directly reduce GDP, but also create
a negative domino effect (negative multiplier) by increasing
unemployment, decreasing consumption, and reducing output.138
Olivier Blanchard, former chief economist for the International
Monetary Fund, assessed that for every dollar a government cuts,
the economy shrinks by significantly more than one dollar.139 The
cuts drag the economy toward stagnation, which prolongs the

Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States, 45 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER
CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUB. POL’Y 13, 15 (1996).
135. For a list of borrowing limitations, see STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING STATE DEBT,
PEW CHARITABLE TRUST app. A (June 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/
2017/06/sfh_strategies_for_managing_state_debt_final.pdf.
136. David Schleicher, Hands On! Part I: The Trilemma Facing the Federal Government
During State and Local Budget Crises, YALE L. SCH., PUB. L. & LEGAL RSCH. SERIES (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3649278.
137. Sebastian Gechert, Gustav Horn & Christoph Paetz, Long‐Term Effects of Fiscal
Stimulus and Austerity in Europe, 81 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 647, 663–64 (2019).
138. Dimitrios Bermperoglou, Evi Pappa & Eugenia Vella, Spending-Based Austerity
Measures and Their Effects on Output and Unemployment 4 (CEPR Discussion Paper No.
DP9383, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2231874.
139. Olivier Blanchard & Daniel Leigh, Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers 3
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/1, 2013), https://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Growth-Forecast-Errors-and-Fiscal-Multipliers-40200;
Where Does the Buck Stop?, supra note 124; Remy Davison, We Were Wrong: IMF Report
Details the Damage of Austerity, CONVERSATION (Jan. 9, 2013, 10:19 PM),
https://theconversation.com/we-were-wrong-imf-report-details-the-damage-of-austerity11533.
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length of the crisis and deepens its severity.140 The effects of
spending cuts made by state governments may be particularly
significant because federal funding is often transferred to the states
in the form of matching grants. This means that for every dollar the
state does not spend, the federal government does not transfer the
corresponding grant. The state’s budget loses twice, and the
economic damage is compounded both in the state and at the
national level.141
And indeed, several studies show the detrimental
consequences of state cuts in previous recessions and the adverse
effects of such cuts on the U.S. economy as a whole.142 Hansjörg
Blöchliger and others examined how national economic crises
impact subsovereign entities in OECD member countries.143 They
concluded that states in the United States have the most procyclical
reaction to national crisis of all OECD members.144 Due to balanced
budget constraints and lack of sufficient federal assistance, they
implement severe austerity measures, and since the states
economies’ share in the national economy is considerable, these
measures take a toll not only on the states themselves but also on
the national economy.145 Jiri Jonas, from the International Monetary
Fund, reached the same conclusion.146 He elaborated on the
austerity measures states implemented during the Great Recession
and concluded that as a result of these tightening measures, the
contribution of state and local governments to the national
140. Austerity measures, for example, contributed to the length and depth of the recent
recession in Europe, and they had a significant influence on the crisis in Greece. See Philipp
Heimberger, Did Fiscal Consolidation Cause the Double-Dip Recession in the Euro Area?, 5 REV.
KEYNESIAN ECON. 439, 443 (2017); see also Nicos Christodoulakis, From Grexit to Growth: On
Fiscal Multipliers and How to End Recession in Greece, 224 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 66, 70 (2013).
141. See Gerst & Wilson, supra note 134, at 2–3.
142. Matthew Fiedler & Wilson Powell III, States Will Need More Fiscal Relief.
Policymakers Should Make That Happen Automatically, BROOKINGS (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2020/04/02/
states-will-need-more-fiscal-relief-policymakers-should-make-that-happen-automatically/.
143. Hansjörg Blöchliger, Claire Charbit, José Maria Pinero Campos & Camila Vamalle,
Sub-Central Governments and the Economic Crisis: Impact and Policy Responses 1 (Org. Econ.
Co-operation & Dev. Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 752, 2010), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/economics/sub-central-governments-and-the-economic-crisis_5kml6xq5bgwc-en.
144. Id. at 19–20.
145. Id.
146. Jiri Jonas, Great Recession and Fiscal Squeeze at U.S. Subnational Government Level 32–
33 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/184, 2012), https://papers-ssrncom.ezproxy.haifa.ac.il/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169729.
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economy was negative. This worsened the crisis and slowed down
the recovery.147 Paul Krugman, Nobel prize laureate in economics,
also explained the economic damage caused by the states’
retrenchment policies in the Great Recession as follows:
True, the federal government has avoided all-out austerity. But
state and local governments, which must run more or less
balanced budgets, have slashed spending and employment as
federal aid runs out—and this has been a major drag on the
overall economy. Without those spending cuts, we might already
have been on the road to self-sustaining growth; as it is, recovery
still hangs in the balance.148

Not assisting states in times of crisis, therefore, has a boomerang
effect. It is true that the federal government may save the costs of
assistance, but the federal omission causes the states to drag the
whole economy down. Instead of the federal government investing
in the states’ economies and creating a positive multiplier that boosts
the economy, the states cut costs, creating a negative multiplier and
dampening the economy. This is unsound economic policy.
It is also important to note, in this context, that the budget cuts
especially hurt the weak. When forced to reduce costs, states often
attempt to decrease, to the extent possible, Medicaid funding,
unemployment benefits, and welfare support. The lack of federal
assistance, therefore, hurts the economy in general, but especially
those who need the state government’s protection the most. Due to
these cuts, individuals are left without sufficient assistance and often
without basic essential services a sovereign has a duty to provide
(such as health services, welfare, and adequate education).149

147. Id. at 25–28.
148. Krugman, supra note 16; see also David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118
HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2609–10 (2005) (“Thus, far from being able to increase spending or cut
taxes to ‘prime the pump’ for their constituencies, state and local governments must cut
spending or raise taxes. With state and local governments accounting for over two-fifths of
total public spending in the United States, these actions offset a significant part of the
stimulative effects of federal fiscal policies.”) (footnotes omitted); Schleicher, supra note 136
(manuscript at 11).
149. ALICE M. RIVLIN, BROOKINGS INST., ANOTHER STATE FISCAL CRISIS: IS THERE A
BETTER WAY? 3–4 (2002); Elizabeth McNichol, Michael Leachman & Joshuah Marshall, States
Need Significantly More Fiscal Relief to Slow the Emerging Deep Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES 17–19 (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/4-14-20sfp.pdf; GERST & WILSON, supra note 134, at 3–4; Fiedler & Powell, supra
note 142.
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C. The Ex Ante Effects of Strict Budget Constraints on Federal Policy
I have concentrated, until now, on the ex post effects of a nofederal-intervention policy on states’ fiscal crises. I showed that
leaving the states to independently deal with a crisis causes states
to take procyclical measures, which harm the states’ economies and
the national economy. A no-assistance policy, however, may also
have adverse ex ante effects. Since the federal government knows
it is under no obligation to assist states, it is liable, ex ante (before
or during the crisis), to strategically shift costs to the state
governments, thereby contributing to the development of a crisis
and worsening its effects.
Although the federal and state governments are closely
connected,150 the two levels of government can also be seen as
competitors.151 They compete for tax resources or for political
support, and each level wishes to be given public credit for
government spending while it disassociates itself from the
economic costs (deficit) involved with spending.152 As part of this
competitive behavior, politicians on both levels of government
have an interest in showing their constituencies that they invest in
projects that benefit the public, but to externalize the costs to a
different government level—to take credit for policies they adopt,
but at the same time discreetly funnel the bill to the other level’s
taxpayers.153 The literature on cost shifting often concentrates on ex
ante opportunistic behavior by states and local governments when
they expect federal bailouts (an issue on which I elaborate later),154
but the federal government often also extracts benefits and
externalizes costs to the state and local governments. Iris Lav and
Andrew Brecher examined federal cost shifting between 2002 and

150. FEDERAL SPENDING IN THE STATES, 2005 TO 2014, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. 1 (Mar. 2016),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/03/federal_spending_in_the_states_20052014.pdf.
151. John Shannon & James Edwin Kee, The Rise of Competitive Federalism, 9 PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN. 5, 6 (1989); Craig Volden, Intergovernmental Political Competition in
American Federalism, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 327 (2005).
152. Shannon & Kee, supra note 151, at 11–12.
153. Andrew Abbott & Philip Jones, Procyclical Government Spending: A Public Choice
Analysis, 154 PUB. CHOICE 243, 245–48 (2013); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates,
Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services,
46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1369–70 (1993).
154. Cost shifting from the states to the federal governments occurs, for example, when
the states ask for a federal bailout. See discussion infra Part III.
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2005.155 They showed that, during this period, the federal
government adopted policies that cost states and local
governments no less than $175 billion but provided them with just
$20 billion to compensate for these policies.156 States had to absorb
the $155 billion difference, and many of them suffered economic
distress as a result.157
One channel for such cost shifting is unfunded mandates—i.e.,
federal policies imposed on states and local governments that are
not adequately financed by the federal government.158 Although
the federal government’s ability to impose unfunded mandates was
curtailed by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(UMRA),159 according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
from 2006 to 2018,160 Congress still enacted 217 laws with 443
unfunded mandates directed to state and local governments.161
These mandates shifted billions of dollars of federal policies’ costs
to the states, and the states had to finance them independently. 162
Federal tax policies also adversely affect state economies.163
Although federal tax policies do not shift federal costs to the state
level per se (and, therefore, these policies are not considered
unfunded mandates), they cost states billions of dollars in lost tax

155. Iris J. Lav & Andrew Brecher, Passing Down the Deficit: Federal Policies Contribute to
the Severity of the State Fiscal Crisis, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Aug. 18, 2004),
https://www.cbpp.org/archives/5-12-04sfp.htm.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40957, UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT: HISTORY,
IMPACT, AND ISSUES 7 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40957.pdf [hereinafter
UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT].
159. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 provides a framework for estimating
the costs imposed by federal legislation on state and local governments. The Act aims to
decrease the extent of federal unfunded mandates in two ways. First, it includes certain
procedural provisions that impose costly mandates without providing funding. Second, the
Act requires federal agencies to assess the implication of federal rules on states and local
governments and the private sector. See id. at 2–4; Daniel E. Troy, The Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 139–40 (1997).
160. According to Lav and Brecher, between 2002 and 2005, unfunded mandates
imposed by the federal government cost states no less than $73 billion. See Lav & Brecher,
supra note 155.
161. UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT, supra note 158, at 22.
162. For a list of unfunded mandates that exceed the statutory limit, see id. at 20–22.
163. See id. at 9–10; Jeremy Pilaar, Starving the Statehouse: The Hidden Tax Policies Behind
States’ Long-Run Fiscal Crises, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 348–49 (2018).
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revenues.164 Brian Galle composed a dataset of all federal statutes
affecting state taxing capacity between 1900 and 2007.165 He
concluded that, when acting in this area, Congress almost
invariably restricted the states’ taxing authority, especially when
such restriction served an interest group from which federal
politicians sought support.166
That the federal government is not accountable to the states’
economies, and that it is under no obligation to assist states in times
of fiscal crisis, facilitates the federal cost-shifting policies. If federal
politicians knew, ex ante, that if a state crisis occurs the federal
government will be responsible for the shifted costs, then perhaps
they would more thoroughly consider the implications of their
adopted policies. Some of the shifted costs would be internalized
and inefficient externalizations would be mitigated.
The COVID-19 crisis provides an excellent example. The federal
government’s response to the pandemic was slow and passive.167
The federal government saw itself as a backup to state governments
rather than the leader and the manager of the crisis.168 As such, it
assigned responsibilities to the states but failed to provide them
with adequate resources to execute their new obligations.169 This
164. The Internet Tax Freedom Act, for example, prevents state and local governments
from imposing an internet access tax, and, according to the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, states are deprived of revenues of $6.5 billion a year as a result. See JEFFREY M.
STUPAK, THE INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT: IN BRIEF, CONG RSCH. SERV. 2 (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43772.pdf; Michael Mazerov, Congress Should End—Not
Extend—the Ban on State and Local Taxation of Internet Access Subscriptions, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (July 10, 2014), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/7-10-14sfp.pdf.
165. Brian Galle, Kill Quill, Keep the Dormant Commerce Clause: History’s Lessons on
Congressional Control of State Taxation, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 158, 162 (2018).
166. Id. at 159.
167. Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally—The
U.S. Response to Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. e75(1), e75(1) (2020).
168. J. Edwin Benton, Challenges to Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations and
Takeaways Amid the COVID-19 Experience, 50 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 536, 539–40 (2020);
Donald F. Kettl, States Divided: The Implications of American Federalism for COVID-19, 80 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 595, 595 (2020); Cynthia J. Bowling, Jonathan M. Fisk & John C. Morris, Seeking
Patterns in Chaos: Transactional Federalism in the Trump Administration’s Response to the COVID19 Pandemic, 50 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 512, 516 (2020); TESTING BLUEPRINT: OPENING UP
AMERICA AGAIN, WHITE HOUSE, CDC, AND FDA, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Testing-Blueprint.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
169. Governor Andrew Cuomo was quoted as saying: “Is there any funding so I can do
these things that you want us to do? No. That is passing the buck without passing the bucks.”
Maria Caspani & Nathan Layne, U.S. Coronavirus Crisis Takes a Sharp Political Turn, REUTERS
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created severe problems for states—both medical and economic.
On the one hand, states did not have the tools to address the
pandemic,170 while on the other hand they had to take on massive
expenditures they could not have planned for.171 The federal
government, however, refused to acknowledge its responsibility. It
argued it is under no obligation to provide federal aid, and it was
reluctant to assist states, even those that have been hard hit by the
virus (naturally, through no fault of their own).172 On the contrary,
President Trump turned federal aid into a political issue, saying
that “bailouts are unfair to Republicans, because all the states that need
federal aid are run by Democrats.”173
Presumably, the fact that the federal government has no formal
legal obligation to help distressed states rendered its disregard for
(Apr. 17, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa/u-scoronavirus-crisis-takes-a-sharp-political-turn-idUSKBN21Z2HN.
170. At least in certain states, there was a lack of medical equipment and an
insufficient number of tests. Sick people were not taken care of, and infected people
unknowingly spread the virus. Soo Rin Kim, Olivia Rubin & Ali Dukakis, 13 States
Now Report Coronavirus Testing Issues, in Echo of Early Troubles, ABC NEWS (July 10, 2020, 2:02
AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/13-states-now-report-coronavirus-testing-issuesecho/story?id=71698974. Instead of funneling testing and equipment according to needs,
rich and relatively uninfected states had more than they needed while weaker infected
states were unable to provide medical supplies. Apoorva Mandavilli & Catie Edmondson,
‘This Is Not the Hunger Games’: National Testing Strategy Draws Concerns, N.Y. TIMES
(May 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/health/coronavirus-testingtrump.html?searchResultPosition=1.
171. The states did not plan for the pandemic, and yet suddenly their budgets had to
finance tests and medical supplies (as well as unemployment insurance, Medicaid, and so
on). The cost shifting was further aggravated because without national coordination, states
had to compete against one another in the procurement of medical supplies. This
competition, as New York’s Governor Andrew Cuomo pointed out, drove prices upward
and inflated states’ expenses. See Susan B. Glasser, How Did the U.S. End Up with Nurses
Wearing Garbage Bags?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/letter-from-trumps-washington/the-coronavirus-and-how-the-united-states-endedup-with-nurses-wearing-garbage-bags; Wajahat Ali, This Is What Happens When the Federal
Government Abandons You, ATLANTIC (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2020/04/how-do-you-win-war-when-your-government-abandons-you/609457/;
Amy Feldman, States Bidding Against Each Other Pushing Up Prices of Ventilators Needed to
Fight Coronavirus, NY Governor Cuomo Says, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2020, 1:23 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/amyfeldman/2020/03/28/states-bidding-against-eachother-pushing-up-prices-of-ventilators-needed-to-fight-coronavirus-ny-governor-cuomosays/?sh=7be07c0c293e.
172. Carney, supra note 6; Alan Greenblatt, Why Federal Aid Remains a Tough Sell for
States and Localities, GOVERNING (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.governing.com/finance/WhyFederal-Aid-Remains-a-Tough-Sell-for-States-and-Localities.html.
173. Bowden & Nelson, supra note 11 (emphasis added).
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the plight of states more severe. The federal government did not
need to worry about the prices of the states’ medical supplies
because it did not have to pay for them.174 It could put the burden
of testing on the states because that way it avoided responsibility
both for the tests’ direct costs and for indirect costs (economic and
political) associated with insufficient testing.175 I don’t argue that
had there been a legal obligation to provide federal aid to states, the
Trump administration’s policies would have turned 180 degrees,
or that the federal response to COVID-19 would have been
swift and efficient. I do argue, however, that perhaps the federal
externalization of obligations and costs would have been mitigated.
If the federal government had known ex ante that it might
eventually need to pay back the cost externalized to the states, then
the cost shifting would perhaps have been conducted with less
zealotry. The federal government would have been more willing
to help the states mitigate damages instead of fighting with them
concerning who was responsible for their crisis.
III. THE DARK SIDE OF THE FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS—
MORAL HAZARDS AND POLITICS
Abstention from federal assistance to states in fiscal distress
can, therefore entail significant ex post costs (such as state
retrenchment measures which would harm the economy) and ex
ante costs (such as federal cost shifting). The existence of such costs,
however, does not mean that bailing out distressed states is
preferable. When the federal government fiscally aids states, it is
likely to create a different set of problems that may be no less severe
than the costs associated with not bailing them out.
In this Part, I discuss the dark side of federal assistance policies.
I show that federal assistance, albeit often economically necessary,
can harm the economy in the long run and may ultimately fail to
help the troubled states.

174. See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 167.
175. See supra note 170.
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A. Moral Hazard or Soft Budget Constraints
Perhaps the most important problem created by federal assistance,
especially bailouts of specific states, is a moral hazard problem.176
“Moral hazard” can be defined as excessive risk taking due to
eligibility for an insurance benefit.177 The insurance beneficiary
knows that even if the insured risk materializes he will not bear any
losses (because he is insured), so he has an incentive to increase his
exposure to the risk.178 Although states are not insured in the
conventional meaning of the word, a federal bailout creates a
similar incentive structure. If the state knows that if it experiences
fiscal distress the federal government will come to its rescue, it has
an interest to overspend and create deficits. By strategically
behaving in this manner, the state enjoys the benefits of its
expenditures while shifting their costs to the federal taxpayer.179
Robert Inman showed that this strategic behavior not only unfairly
transfers states’ costs to the federal taxpayer (or to any other entity
that finances the bailout), it is also inefficient with respect to the
economy as a whole.180 He explained that to maintain an efficient
allocation of resources in the economy, each entity that enjoys a
product or a service should internalize its costs. The states’ failure
to internalize the costs of their expenditures leads to
overconsumption and creates social losses.181

176. Gillette, supra note 20, at 1148–53; Gelpern, supra note 20, at 917–19; Jonathan
Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS,
CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 123, 125–27 (Peter
Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012); Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts:
Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951, 956–59 (1992); see also Timothy J.
Goodspeed, Bailouts in a Federation, 9 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 409, 410–11 (2002); David E.
Wildasin, Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal
Relations, PUB. ECON. (1999); Schleicher, supra note 136, at 7–10.
177. John M. Marshall, Moral Hazard, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1976).
178. Mark V. Pauly, Comment, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REV.
531 (1968).
179. Gillette, supra note 20, at 1148–53; Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts:
Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline, 12 CONST. POL. ECON. 141, 146–48 (2001).
180. Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with Lessons
from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET
CONSTRAINTS (Jonathan Rodden et al. eds., 2003).
181. Id.
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The moral hazard risk created by a federal bailout leads to an
interesting interplay between federal and state governments.182 If
the state has bailout expectations (i.e., it assumes that the federal
government will bail it out before a default occurs), then it will
overspend and create deficits. That way state residents and
politicians enjoy the benefits of spending, and the federal
government covers the costs.183 If, on the other hand, the state
believes that the federal government will never bail it out, then
it will act in a fiscally responsible manner. State politicians will
understand that unbridled spending will result in a default, and
they will not want to incur the economic and political costs
associated with a fiscal crisis. Therefore, if the federal government
wants to prevent excessive spending by states, it should firmly
commit to a no-bailout policy. If the federal government is
sufficiently resolute in not bailing out states even when they face
default, in the long run, states will behave in a fiscally responsible
manner.184 The problem is that when facing a possible default and
acknowledging its potential costs (both to the states and to the
federal government itself), the federal government has trouble
sticking to its no-bailout commitment. The federal government is
concerned with the adverse effects of states’ procyclical measures
and with the contagion effects of default, and it seeks, for both
economic and political reasons, to end the fiscal crisis as soon as
possible.185 The federal government is, therefore, faced with a
dilemma: whether to bail out the state and prevent the immediate
economic and political damage associated with the state’s fiscal

182. JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX—THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF
FISCAL FEDERALISM 50–55 (2006). Rodden describes a slightly more complicated game than
described here in which after a financial shock occurs, the state has two decision nodes. In
the first decision node, the state can adjust its expenses right after the shock occurs. If it
chooses not to do so and the central government decides not to bail it out, it can also decide
to do a late expenditure adjustment. The two-stage game enables a more nuanced decisionmaking process, which is not relevant to our discussion. Rodden’s game is based on the
international conflict “deterrence game.” For an elaborate analysis of the game in an
international conflict context, see Stephen L. Quackenbush, General Deterrence and
International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory, 36 INT’L INTERACTIONS 60 (2010).
183. RODDEN, supra note 182, at 52–53.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 54–55; see also Alexander Plekhanov & Raju Singh, How Should Subnational
Government Borrowing Be Regulated? Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence, 53 IMF STAFF
PAPERS 426, 428 (2006).
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crisis or stand firm and prevent the moral hazard implications of
increased spending in the long run.186
Empirical studies show that choosing the bailout option may
create significant costs. When jurisdictions expect a central bailout,
they increase expenditures and take on more debt, which may lead
to economic crises in the long run. Per Pettersson-Lidbom, for
example, showed that the level of local borrowing depends on the
local government’s bailout expectations. Using the share of
neighboring jurisdictions receiving discretionary transfers as a
proxy for bailout expectations (under the assumption if the
neighbors received discretionary transfers, so will the
municipality), she showed that jurisdictions that expected a
government bailout increased their level of debt by twenty percent
on average.187 Massimo Bordignon and Gilberto Turati reached
similar conclusions with respect to health expenditures in Italy.
They assumed that a region’s bailout expectations can be measured
on the basis of past bailouts the region received, and they
demonstrated that regional health expenditures were correlated
with the region’s bailout expectations.188 Teresa Garcia-Mila and
others found evidence that Spanish regions also borrowed as a
response to the central government’s transfers. They measured the
regions’ expectations of bailouts using their income per capita and
share in the population and showed that the greater the bailout
expectations, the higher the debt per capita in the region.189
B. The Bailout as a Political Tool in the Hands of the
Federal Government
Perhaps due to these moral hazard problems, the United
States federal government has generally maintained a firm

186. RODDEN, supra note 182, at 54–55.
187. Per Pettersson-Lidbom, Dynamic Commitment and the Soft Budget Constraint: An
Empirical Test, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 154 (2010).
188. Massimo Bordignon & Gilberto Turati, Bailing Out Expectations and Public Health
Expenditure, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 305 (2009).
189. Teresa Garcia-Mila, Timothy Goodspeed & Therese J. McGuire, Fiscal
Decentralization Policies and Sub-National Government Debt in Evolving Federations (UPF
Business and Economics Working Paper No. 549, 2002), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=310116; see also Alexander Fink & Thomas Stratmann,
Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints, 64 KYKLOS
366 (2011) (regarding Germany).
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no-bailout policy.190 It has refused to rescue individual debt-ridden
states, even under the threat of economic crisis and default.191
However, when faced with a national economic crisis (such as the
Great Recession or the COVID-19 pandemic), the federal
government has responded with a fiscal stimulus. It understood
that in these crises, the damage of a no-state-assistance policy to the
states’ economies can be so severe that Keynesian countercyclical
measures (infusions of money into the economy) must be taken;
otherwise, as in the Great Depression, the nation will be stuck in
stagnation for years.
During the Great Recession, the federal government enacted the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).192
Pursuant to the Act, the federal government distributed
approximately $800 billion to different causes, and a substantial
sum of $143 billion was dedicated to state fiscal relief.193 The same
type of federal assistance was transferred as a result of the COVID19 pandemic. The federal government enacted the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act of 2020 (CARES), which
provided $2 trillion dollars as a general stimulus to the United
States economy, with $150 billion in direct assistance to states and

190. See Gillette, supra note 20, at 1150. Perhaps the most notable manifestation of the
no-bailout policy occurred in the nineteenth century. In the crisis of the mid-nineteenth
century, despite severe contagion effects on the federal government, and notwithstanding a
congressional committee report recommending that the federal government assume the
states’ debts, the federal government did not conduct a bailout. It preferred to stand idle,
unwilling to financially assist them, as no fewer than nine states defaulted or repudiated
their debts. See RODDEN supra note 182, at 55–72.
191. RODDEN, supra note 182, at 72 (“However, by the twentieth century, through its
institutions and its actions, the central government had established a rather firm
commitment not to bail out troubled states, even in the face of default. State policymakers
learned that future borrowing would have to be supported by taxation, and negative shocks
would have to be endured alone.”).
192. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009), according to a presidential report to Congress, “was to provide countercyclical fiscal
support for the economy as part of a suite of monetary and fiscal policies aimed at containing
the already-severe recession . . . .” See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 91–146 (2014),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ERP-2014/pdf/ERP-2014.pdf.
193. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 192, at 99. The federal
government increased Medicaid financing by $87 billion, supported education programs
with $53.6 billion, facilitated states’ access to the credit markets, and generally infused money
into the states to dampen budget cuts and tax increases states needed to make because of the
recession. Id. at 137–38.
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local governments.194 This type of general aid enables the federal
government to help states with fewer moral hazards issues,195 but
it does create other problems. For an economic stimulus to kick in,
Congress needs to decide that federal aid is required and to
establish, usually through a lengthy legislation process, the way the
aid will be distributed. This discretionary nature of federal
assistance is both slow and political.
Economists maintain that one of the important qualities of an
economic stimulus is timing.196 It is imperative that the stimulus be
timely because a delayed fiscal stimulus not only fails to help the
economy when the infusion of money is most needed, it can
damage the economy. It may increase the federal deficit for no
reason, add inflation risks, and exacerbate economic cycles rather
than dampen them.197 The problem with congressionally enacted
federal assistance is that it usually requires a long time to launch,
so it may result in a late stimulus. By the time Congress realizes that
the economy is in recession and the legislative process reaches a
compromise that is approved, the economy is already on its way to
recovery.198 Former treasury secretary Lawrence Summers testified
before Congress in 2008:
The major problem with past stimulus efforts is that the stimulus
has come too late. If stimulus is to be timely, it should be delivered
promptly. By the time it is conclusively established that a

194. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 1334 Stat.
281 (2020); CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46298, GENERAL STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE AND COVID19: BACKGROUND AND AVAILABLE DATA (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R46298; Assistance for State, Local and Tribal Governments, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares/state-and-local-governments#:~:text=
and%20Tribal%20Governments-,The%20CARES%20Act%20Provides%20Assistance%20for
%20State%2C%20Local%2C%20and%20Tribal,%24150%20billion%20Coronavirus%20Relief
%20Fund (last visited Nov. 19, 2021).
195. The general aid can mitigate states’ procyclical measures, but, since it is general
and connected to a specific national crisis, the assistance creates fewer bailout expectations.
States cannot expect to be bailed out if they overspend, only if there is a national crisis and
all states are harmed by it.
196. DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF & JASON FURMAN, IF, WHEN, HOW: A PRIMER ON
FISCAL STIMULUS 10 (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
0110_fiscal_stimulus_elmendorf_furman.pdf.
197. Id. at 10–13.
198. Alan S. Blinder, The Case Against the Case Against Discretionary Fiscal Policy 7–8
(CEPS Working Paper No. 100, 2004), https://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/
100blinder.pdf.
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recession has started, policy is likely to have been substantially
delayed from what would have been optimal. 199

The second federal COVID-19 relief package is a good example
of the perils of a legislated stimulus process.200 As Democrats and
Republicans have battled over the amount of relief, the U.S.
economy has gravely suffered. Unemployment soared, persons
who lost their jobs were unable to pay rent, and states could barely
cope with the downturn.201 Although a compromise was eventually
reached, there can be hardly any doubt that the stimulus arrived far
too late.202
In addition to its delayed distribution, a second problem with
a legislated stimulus is that politicians often use it as a political
tool. Instead of transferring federal aid to states and programs
that need it most, resources are poorly targeted, and transfers are
mired down by political interests. Andrew Young and Russell
Sobel examined the federal aid given to different states under
the ARRA during the Great Recession.203 They looked at two types
of variables—states’ economic characteristics204 and states’ political
influence at the federal level205—and they measured the effect
of each of these variables on the amount of aid each state received.
Their conclusions are disconcerting. They showed that the
ARRA stimulus was poorly designed as a countercyclical measure.
199. What Should the Federal Government Do to Avoid Recession?: Hearing Before the Joint
Econ. Comm. Cong. U.S., 110th Cong. 42 (2008) (prepared statement of Senator Dr. Lawrence
Summers, former U.S. Treasury Secretary, Cambridge, MA).
200. For a detailed analysis regarding the discretionary response to COVID-19, see
Rocco et al., supra note 120.
201. Luke Broadwater, Emily Cochrane, Sarah Mervosh & Alan Rappeport, Governors
Say Trump’s Order on Pandemic Relief Could Wreck State Budgets, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/us/politics/virus-stimulus-congress-trump.html.
202. In addition, since federal aid is the product of a political process, by definition it is
decided on through compromise. Compromises take time to reach, and they are usually
unsatisfying to both sides. Compromises take into account the opinions of those who support
austerity measures as well as those who support countercyclical action, and therefore they
often do not provide sufficient stimulus to the economy. See HEATHER BOUSHEY, RYAN
NUNN, JIMMY O’DONNELL & JAY SHAMBAUGH, THE DAMAGE DONE BY RECESSIONS AND HOW
TO RESPOND 34–35 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
AutoStabilizers_framingchapter_web_20190506.pdf.
203. Andrew T. Young & Russell S. Sobel, Recovery and Reinvestment Act Spending at the
State Level: Keynesian Stimulus or Distributive Politics?, 155 PUB. CHOICE 449 (2013).
204. For example, the states’ unemployment rate, revenue growth, per-capita GDP, etc.
205. For example, the average tenure of the states’ senate and house representatives,
the number of members the state had in the appropriations committees, and more.
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The Keynesian economic variables—the variables that represent
the states’ need of the fiscal aid—did not affect the distribution of
federal resources, and in some cases the amount of aid given was
the reverse of what economic theory prescribes. There was no
correlation, for example, between the provided aid and the changes
in unemployment rates in the different states, and there was a
significant correlation between aid and the level of state GDP
(while economic theory suggests the connection should be the exact
opposite). The political variables, on the other hand, had a
significant effect. The more representatives a state had in the
appropriation committees, the higher the federal aid per capita it
received. Robert Inman reached similar conclusions.206 He
demonstrated that federal assistance was uncorrelated with state
unemployment (which he argued was the main driver of states’
fiscal woes) and was significantly correlated to congressional
politics. Inman examined the position of each state’s two senators
with respect to the ARRA bill: whether they both supported the bill,
both objected to it, or had different opinions. He showed that the
most important factor in the senators’ positions was the amount of
aid classified as “other aid” that their state received (funds
allocated to small state programs, old and new, the distribution of
which the senators could influence). The higher the portion of
funds classified as “other aid” distributed to a state, the higher the
probability that the state’s senators would support the bill. This
implies that more than anything, senators want to control federal
allocated funds for personal political benefits.
Politics also played a major role in the provision of federal fiscal
assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic under CARES.
Although it is too early to present statistical analyses of the
effect of political considerations on the appropriation of CARES
funds, statements made by the president and other senior political
officials give the impression that political and personal
considerations were not off the table, to say the least, in deciding
on federal grants. President Trump explicitly connected federal aid
to complying with federal views on unrelated political issues,
hinting that cities and states that would not comply with his
administration’s policies on immigration, taxes, and big businesses

206. Inman, supra note 103.
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would not receive federal funds.207 The president also instructed his
administration, in an official memorandum, to review federal
funding to state and local governments that, in his words, are
permitting “anarchy, violence and destruction in American
cities,”208 even though scientific evidence suggests that the spread
of damage from the pandemic had little to do with political protests
and police rules.209 In addition, reviewing some of the federal
appropriations under the act gives the impression that economic
considerations were not necessarily the only issue on legislators’
minds. CARES, for example, allowed for a $170 billion tax break for
real estate investors (such as Jared Kushner) and a $500 billion
bailout fund for big businesses.210 These funds were distributed
without sufficient transparency, and it was reported that they
assisted President Trump’s family, contributors, and lobbyists’
clients.211 As part of the CARES legislative process, both sides of the
political map attempt to maximize the political benefits they can
gain from the bailout funds, without always trying to maximize the
economic benefits that can be earned with federal dollars.212

207. It was reported that the President tweeted on Tuesday, May 5 that: “Well run
States should not be bailing out poorly run States, using CoronaVirus as the excuse! The
elimination of Sanctuary Cities, Payroll Taxes, and perhaps Capital Gains Taxes, must be
put on the table. Also lawsuit indemnification & business deductions for restaurants & ent.”
See Sonam Sheth, Trump Says He Might Give Federal Coronavirus Aid to States if They
Comply with His Political Demands, BUS. INSIDER (May 5, 2020, 2:10 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-tweets-federal-coronavirus-aid-may-dependon-sanctuary-cities-2020-5.
208. Administration of Donald J. Trump, Memorandum on Reviewing Funding to State
and Local Government Recipients of Federal Funds That Are Permitting Anarchy, Violence, and
Destruction in American Cities (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/DCPD-202000647/pdf/DCPD-202000647.pdf; Maggie Haberman & Jesse McKinley,
Trump Moves to Cut Federal Funding from Democratic Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/us/politics/trump-funding-cities.html.
209. See Dhaval M. Dave, Andrew I. Friedson, Kyutaro Matsuzawa, Joseph J. Sabia &
Samuel Safford, Black Lives Matter Protests and Risk Avoidance: The Case of Civil Unrest During
a Pandemic (NBER Working Paper No. 27408, 2021), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27408.
210. Michael Grunwald, The Mega-Bailout Leaves 4 Mega-Questions, POLITICO (Mar. 28,
2020, 5:01 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/28/congress coronavirus-relief-bill-152922.
211. Maggie Severns, Kushner Company Stands to Benefit from Freeze on Federal Mortgage
Payments, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/
04/03/jared-kushner-company-benefit-recovery-bill-162652; Aryeh Mellman & Norman
Eisen, Addressing the Other COVID Crisis: Corruption, BROOKINGS (July 22, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/addressing-the-other-covid-crisis-corruption/.
212. See Grunwald, supra note 210.
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IV. TOWARDS AN EX ANTE FEDERAL STABILIZATION MECHANISM
It seems that the analysis to this point leaves us with a
conundrum. On one hand, as we have seen, when states enter into
a fiscal crisis, especially as a result of a national recession or
systemic catastrophe (like COVID-19), the federal government
needs to give states fiscal assistance. Without such assistance, states
are forced to take procyclical measures, which prolong and deepen
the crisis. On the other hand, as we have also seen, federal
assistance to prevent a default or mitigate a crisis also is
problematic. Federal aid can create moral hazard problems, causing
states to overspend, and it is mired in political agency problems.
In order to mitigate this tension, the federal system should be
able to help states stabilize their economies without generating
moral hazard or political agency problems. It needs to be able to
infuse funds into state and local economies without paving the way
to future overspending and without allowing federal politicians to
use the funds for their own political and personal interests. To
achieve this goal, I suggest an ex ante scheme of federal
stabilization. The scheme has two components: a more expansive
use of automatic fiscal stabilizers and use of the Fed’s authority as
a lender of last resort.
A. Automatic Stabilizers
As I have indicated, one of the main problems with federal
stabilization programs is that they are discretionary. Federal action
takes place only ex post, after the crisis has occurred, and whether
to take action and what actions to take is decided in Congress
(through a lengthy legislation process). This, I argued, renders the
federal response slow, partial, and political. One solution to this
problem is a more expansive use of automatic, as opposed to
discretionary, fiscal stabilizers. The automatic stabilizers afford
federal assistance, but without (or with less of) the excess baggage
of moral hazard and political interests.
When examining fiscal stabilization programs, we can
differentiate between two types of stabilizing tools: discretionary
and automatic.213 Discretionary tools are put into place ex post, after
a crisis has already occurred (as in the cases of ARRA and CARES).
213. BOUSHEY ET AL., supra note 202, at 22.
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They are implemented at the discretion of policy makers, who
decide what measures to take and their scope. For example,
Congress realizes that the economy (state or national) suffers from
a fiscal crisis, and then it decides to stimulate the economy using
measures such as fiscal aid, tax cuts, public investments, and so on.
Automatic stabilizing tools, on the other hand, take effect without
discretionary government action. They are automatically triggered
and then they generate a stabilizing response.214
The automatic stabilizers can also be divided into two types,
according to the trigger that causes the stabilizer to take effect:
implicit or explicit.215 Automatic stabilizers with an implicit trigger
are embedded in a program, and the stabilizer kicks in as the
demand for the program increases.216 For example, when the
federal government finances a certain percentage of a welfare
program, more federal funds will be transferred to finance the
program as recession strikes and the demand for welfare services
increase.217 Automatic stabilizers with explicit triggers, on the other
214. Id.; Rocco et al., supra note 120, at 461; Mathias Dolls, Clemens Fuest & Andreas
Peichl, Automatic Stabilization and Discretionary Fiscal Policy in the Financial Crisis, 1 J. LAB.
POL’Y 1 (2012); Darrel Cohen & Glenn Follette, The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers: Quietly Doing
Their Thing, 6 ECON. POL’Y REV. 35 (2000); Olivier Blanchard, Commentary, The Automatic
Fiscal Stabilizers: Quietly Doing Their Thing, ECON. POL’Y REV. 69 (2000).
215. BOUSHEY ET AL., supra note 202, at 23; see also THOMAS BAUNSGAARD & STEVEN A.
SYMANSKY, INT’L MONETARY FUND, AUTOMATIC FISCAL STABILIZERS 7–18 (2009),
https://blog-pfm.imf.org/files/spn09231.pdf (discussing implicit triggers in Part III and
explicit triggers in Part IV).
216. BOUSHEY ET AL., supra note 202, at 23. The implicit automatic stabilizer does not
have to be a program; it can also be the structure of a certain tax, such as income tax. Since
income tax is collected as a percentage of income, in the case of an income shock, when
individuals and firms earn less, they also pay less taxes. The stabilizing effect of the income
tax grows bigger as it becomes more progressive. See Cohen & Follette, supra note 214, at 36–
38; Alisdair McKay & Ricardo Reis, The Role of Automatic Stabilizers in the U.S. Business Cycle,
84 ECONOMETRICA 141, 142 (2016).
217. The additional federal funds are a type of a Keynesian measure that pump money
into the state’s economy and help it to stabilize. See BOUSHEY ET AL., supra note 202, at 23. An
example of such internal stabilizer is the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP). SNAP benefits are financed one hundred percent by the federal government, and
the federal and state governments share the administrative costs. See CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(SNAP) (June 25, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasicsfoodstamps.pdf. This means that as the demand for nutrition assistance rises, so does federal
assistance, while the states’ expenses stay more or less the same. Naturally, though, if the
portion of the program financed by the federal government is low, the state will have to
absorb the additional demand itself, and, at least from the state’s perspective, the stabilizer
loses its positive effect.
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hand, allow for federal assistance when an external predetermined
macroeconomic condition is met.218 For example, the federal
government can determine that when the national/state
unemployment rate reaches a certain threshold (e.g., more than
seven percent), states are entitled to additional federal assistance.219
The use of automatic stabilizers to address economic crises is
important.220 Automatic stabilizers facilitate the implementation of
countercyclical measures in times of economic downturn, and they
have several advantages over discretionary ones. First, as opposed
to discretionary stabilizers, the automatic stabilizers are quickly
implemented. They do not require a lengthy legislation process that
can take months, and they do not even require a procedure for
approval by the federal government. The stabilizers are created ex
ante, before the crisis has occurred, and when the stabilizers’
conditions are met, federal aid is triggered automatically.221 This
enables a quick economic response, which is crucial when dealing
with a fiscal crisis.222
Second, since automatic stabilizers are determined ex ante, they
enhance the confidence of persons and firms in the economy, and
they facilitate better planning. Governmental programs that engage
in social redistribution (welfare, health, etc.) know that their budgets
will not be cut in times of recession, which gives individuals better
social insurance and stabilizes aggregate consumption.223
Third, as opposed to discretionary stabilizers, which are set
ex post, when politicians know who will be the winners and who
will be the losers of a federal bailout,224 automatic stabilizers are
established behind a “veil of ignorance” of sorts.225 When setting
the stabilizers, politicians do not yet know which states will suffer
218. BOUSHEY ET AL., supra note 202, at 23; BAUNSGAARD & SYMANSKY, supra note 215,
at 15.
219. Torben M. Andersen, Automatic Stabilizers—The Intersection of Labour Market and
Fiscal Policies, 5 IZA J. EUR. LAB. STUD. 1, 10 (2016).
220. Fiedler & Powell, supra note 142.
221. BOUSHEY ET AL., supra note 202, at 23; Milton Friedman, A Monetary and Fiscal
Framework for Economic Stability, 38 AM. ECON. REV. 245, 255 (1948).
222. ELMENDORF & FURMAN, supra note 196, at 10–13.
223. McKay & Reis, supra note 216.
224. Cf. Bowden & Nelson, supra note 11.
225. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999) (“Among the essential
features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social
status . . . . The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.”).
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from a severe crisis and which will fare better, so it is harder to
calibrate the automatic stabilizer in accordance with the interests of
specific states. Thus, automatic stabilizers have the potential to be
less political and more target oriented. They can follow economic
criteria for the division of funds, and they are less prone to political
interests and manipulations.226
Fourth, if the automatic stabilizers are correctly set, they should
not create moral hazard problems. The predetermined triggers can
be set such that they are beyond the states’ control (for example, the
trigger can be related to national indicators), or they can be such
that state politicians will have little political interest to reach them
(for example, high state unemployment or poverty rates). When
this is the case, we have little reason to fear that states will
deliberately attempt to activate the triggers to win federal help.
Lastly, automatic stabilizers can also mitigate ex ante federal
cost shifting.227 Depending on the nature of the automatic triggers,
the federal government may be more reluctant to externalize costs
or adversely change tax policies if it knows, ex ante, that it will be
obligated to assist distressed states when recession comes. If, for
example, there is an automatic stabilizer implicit in the Medicaid
program, the federal governments will be more hesitant to shift
health costs to the states.
And indeed, due to the advantages of automatic stabilizers,
even as early as 1948, Milton Friedman, Nobel Prize Laureate in
economics, advocated their use to address economic distress.
Friedman discussed national monetary automatic stabilizers, rather
than state fiscal stabilizers, but the rationale is similar, and
Friedman explained it as follows:
The essence of this fourfold proposal is that it uses automatic
adaptations in the government contribution to the current income
stream to offset, at least in part, changes in other segments of
aggregate demand and to change appropriately the supply of
money. It eliminates discretionary action in response to cyclical
movements as well as some extraneous or perverse reactions of our
present monetary and fiscal structure. 228

226. BOUSHEY ET AL., supra note 202, at 38.
227. See supra Section II.C.
228. Friedman, supra note 221, at 247 (emphases added).
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But despite the benefits of automatic stabilizers, and
notwithstanding
Friedman’s
and
other
economists’
recommendations, in the United States the federal response to fiscal
crises is oriented toward discretionary measures.229 There is some
use of implicit automatic stabilizers (such as the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)),230 but it is usually
insufficient.231 Studies that make international comparisons show
that the use of automatic stabilizers is more widespread in Europe,
especially with respect to unemployment shocks (which, as
explained, are one of the most important factors in states’ fiscal
crises).232 Dolls and others showed that in the case of an
unemployment shock, automatic stabilizers in European countries
absorb 47% of the shock, while in the United States automatic
stabilizers absorb only 34% of the shock.233
A possible reason to the scarce adoption of automatic
stabilization measures in the United States may be the wish to keep
the federal government small.234 However, as the International
Monetary Fund advocates, automatic stabilizers should not
necessarily be connected with the size of government.235 Automatic
stabilizers can be structured in ways that hardly affect federal
expenses in stable periods, so that the stabilizers will kick in only
in times of recession, when the federal government provides aid
through discretionary measures anyway (or at least it did so in
previous crises—the ARRA and CARES).

229. BOUSHEY ET AL., supra note 202, at 27; Rocco et al., supra note 120, at 461.
230. See supra note 217.
231. See supra notes 109–118.
232. Mathias Dolls, Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, Automatic Stabilizers and Economic
Crisis: US vs. Europe, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 279, 290 (2012); see also Julia Darby, Jacques Melitz
& Igor Masten, Social Spending and Automatic Stabilizers in the OECD, 23 ECON. POL’Y 715,
717–18 (2008).
233. Dolls et al., supra note 232, at 290.
234. BAUNSGAARD & SYMANSKY, supra note 215, at 5; Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov,
Government Size and Automatic Stabilizers: International and Intranational Evidence, 55 J. INT’L
ECON. 3 (2001). This explains the difference between Europe and the United States in the
adoption of automatic stabilization measures. Whereas in most European countries’ welfare
programs are expansive and financed by the central government, in the United States welfare
programs are more limited and are financed in large part by the state governments. Through
their welfare programs European governments automatically inject money into the economy
in times of recession, but in the United States the federal government needs to take
discretionary measures to stimulate the economy. See Dolls et al., supra note 232.
235. BAUNSGAARD & SYMANSKY, supra note 215, at 7–15.
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First, there can be a more expansive use of automatic stabilizers
with an explicit external trigger.236 This type of stabilizer provides
temporary assistance, and it applies only when the national or state
economies are in recession and Keynesian expansion measures
should be taken. Claudia Sham, for example, suggested using as
a trigger an increase of half a percentage point or more in the
moving average of the unemployment rate across three months
(compared to the lowest point of the moving average in the past
year). She showed that this indicator would have been able to
identify past recessions and would have triggered federal
assistance nine months before the enaction of the ARRA.237 Such a
trigger would have provided federal assistance in a more timely
manner and, presumably (especially based on examination of the
research about the ARRA), in a more efficient and less political
manner.238 Note that the use of an external trigger could also be
symmetric.239 It could increase federal assistance when
unemployment increases but automatically implement tightening
measures when unemployment goes down. This way, the federal
budget remains balanced over time, but countercyclical measures
are still implemented.
Second, better implicit automatic stabilizers could also be
embedded in the financing of certain programs, such as Medicaid
or unemployment.240 For example, instead of a more or less fixed
federal matching rate, the matching rate could be progressive with
the federal finance percentage set according to demand for the
program. When the demand for Medicaid is relatively low, so
would be the portion of federal finance. A low demand for
Medicaid signifies that the state’s economy is relatively strong (not
many residents are eligible to Medicaid), so the state could finance
a larger portion of Medicaid expenses. However, as the demand
236. Id. at 15; Andersen, supra note 219, at 10.
237. CLAUDIA SAHM, BROOKINGS INST., DIRECT STIMULUS PAYMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS 77
(2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ES_THP_Sahm_web_
20190506.pdf; BOUSHEY ET AL., supra note 202, at 38–39.
238. See supra notes 203–206.
239. BAUNSGAARD & SYMANSKY, supra note 215, at 15.
240. Cf. MATTHEW FIEDLER, JASON FURMAN & WILSON POWELL III, BROOKINGS INST.,
INCREASING FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR STATE MEDICAID AND CHIP PROGRAMS IN RESPONSE TO
ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS 93–127 (2019). The authors suggest a somewhat different
stabilization mechanism, though, an unemployment rate threshold. See also Fiedler & Powell,
supra note 142.
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increases and more state residents are eligible, the federal finance
portion would increase. Increased Medicaid demand indicates an
economic downturn, and the state’s budget should not absorb the
costs of the increased demand with its limited tools for economic
expansion. Such automatic stabilization finance creates a kind of
mandatory rainy-day fund.241 In good times, state governments
would spend more, but when recession strikes, states would not be
required to increase their health expenditures.
It is not the aim of this Article to detail the exact automatic
stabilizers we need to introduce to the federal financing system. My
point is that the use of this type of stabilizers should be more
expansive because they facilitate a more efficient mechanism for
federal aid to states than the discretionary measures currently in
place. Through automatic stabilizers, federal assistance could be
provided in a timely manner, without moral hazards and with less
involvement of political interests.
B. The Federal Reserve as a Lender of Last Resort
Automatic stabilizers would not always be enough to stabilize
the economy of distressed states. They might not facilitate the
transfer of sufficient assistance to the states, and there might be
situations when the stabilizers would not be triggered, at least not
early enough to help states. In these cases, without an additional
federal assistance mechanism, states are liable to resort to default
or to repudiate their debts, with all the costs associated with such
actions as detailed earlier.242 To address instances when the automatic
stabilizers fail to offer adequate help, I suggest a second federal
assistance mechanism which involves the use of the Fed’s authority
as a lender of last resort. I suggest using Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act to enable individual state governments to request the
Fed to purchase their debt instruments in times of downturn.243
The Fed, like most central banks in the world, was designed to
function as lender of last resort to commercial banks.244 During the
241. A rainy-day fund is a fund to which a state allocates a certain portion of its budget
or a certain amount of money each year (in good economic years) to use in case of budget
shortfalls (in years when the state’s expenditures exceed revenues).
242. See Section I.B.
243. 12 U.S.C. § 226.
244. The lender-of-last-resort concept was developed in England and is usually
attributed to Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot. According to the doctrine they
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States suffered
from recurring banking crises (especially the crisis of 1907), and the
founders of the Fed sought to prevent the occurrence of such crises
and limit their effect.245 To do so, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913
vested in the Fed the authority to serve as a lender of last resort to
commercial banks, when commercial banks are unable to borrow
in the market due to a liquidity crisis.246 In 1932, as part of the
Emergency Relief and Construction Act (ERCA), the authority of
the Fed as a lender of last resort was expanded.247 The ERCA added
paragraph 13(3) to the Federal Reserve Act, and it enabled the Fed
to directly purchase certain debt instruments at a discount from any
“individual, partnership, or corporation,” not only from member
banks.248 From 1936 until 2008, the Fed interpreted Section 13(3)
narrowly, and it refused to lend to non-banks.249 During the Great
developed, in times of a liquidity crisis, monetary authorities should freely lend to financial
institutions to prevent their collapse, but at a penalty rate. Monetary economists have later
expanded the role of central banks. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, The Federal Reserve
and Panic Prevention: The Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort, 27 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 45 (2013).
245. Mark A. Carlson & David C. Wheelock, The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons from the
Fed’s First 100 Years 1 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Saint Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-056B, 2012),
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-056.pdf. A banking crisis occurs when
commercial banks suffer from a liquidity crisis—i.e., when they have short-term liabilities
(such as client deposits) while their money is invested in long-term investments or assets
(like long-term bonds). When such a mismatch occurs, a liquidity-short bank may
be unable to honor clients’ withdrawals, and this can create significant externalities on
the banking system as a whole (panic, bank runs, intra-bank loan shortages, and more).
Since central banks such as the Fed can supply an unlimited amount of money, they can
serve as a lender of last resort and are able to lend commercial banks funds they lack. CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING 22 (2020), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R44185.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING].
246. By its nature, the Fed controls the money supply in the country, and can therefore
provide almost unlimited liquidity. FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING, supra note 245,
at 22.
247. Emergency Relief and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 72-302, 47 Stat. 709 (1932).
248. Parinitha Sastry, The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 24
ECON. POL’Y REV., at 1, 2–6, 22, 25 (2018). Later, Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act was
amended to replace the phrase “individual, partnership, or corporation” with the phrase
“participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility.” See Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1101 (2010). This
amendment was designed “to prevent the Fed from bailing out failing firms while preserving
enough of its discretion that it could still create broadly based facilities to address
unpredictable market-access problems during a crisis.” See FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY
LENDING, supra note 245, at 22, 25.
249. Sastry, supra note 248, at 23–28. Section 13(b) of the Federal Reserve Act was used,
but this section has since been repealed. See David Fettig, Lender of More Than Last Resort, FED.
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Recession, and even more extensively during the COVID-19
pandemic, however, the Fed rediscovered this authorization, and it
has been willing to serve as a lender of last resort to non-bank
financial institutions and also to states and local governments.250
I suggest using Section 13(3) as an additional federal assistance
mechanism—in the sense that states (not necessarily local
governments) would generally be able, under certain conditions,
known to the states ex ante, to request the Fed to extend them credit
as a lender of last resort. The Fed, or a professional committee on
its behalf, would decide whether a state meets the set criteria and
whether to extend the requested credit. The most important
eligibility criteria should be the Fed’s decision that the state entered
fiscal distress due to reasons beyond its control. Recall that when
discussing the causes of states’ fiscal distress, I differentiated
between two types: the state’s political agency problems and
national recessions combined with fiscal federalism policies.251
Crises caused by the first type are caused by state politicians’
strategic behavior. There is no reason such deficits would be
covered by the federal government, because covering such deficits
RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Dec. 1, 2002), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/
2002/lender-of-more-than-last-resort.
250. FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING, supra note 245, at 7. During the Great
Recession, the financial markets suffered from a credit crunch. See Markus K. Brunnermeier,
Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–08 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 14612, 2008), https://www.nber.org/papers/w14612. Using Section 13(3), the
Fed facilitated the extension of credit either to promote liquidity in specific securities markets
(for example the commercial paper market, asset-backed securities, and so on) or to
individually financial “too-big-to-fail” firms (such as Bear Sterns and AIG). See FEDERAL
RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING, supra note 245, at 10–16. The COVID-19 economic crisis,
which presented different challenges, required emergency lending also to nonfinancial
institutions. The Fed again used its authority under Section 13(3) and initiated “The Main
Street Lending Program,” which was designed to support small and medium-sized
for-profit businesses and nonprofit organizations. See Policy Tools: Main Street Lending
Program, FED. RSRV. (Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
mainstreetlending.htm. For additional COVID-19 lending programs that made use of Section
13(3), see FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING, supra note 245, at 7–10. In addition,
and more relevant to this Article, the Fed initiated the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF).
See Policy Tools: Municipal Liquidity Facility, FED. RSRV. (Nov. 12, 2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/muni.htm. The MLF allows the Fed to
purchase up to $500 billion of short-term notes from eligible state and local governments “to
help them better manage cash flow pressures” and continue to “serve households and
businesses in their communities.” Id.; see FAQs: Municipal Liquidity Facility, FED. RSRV. BANK
OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/municipal-liquidity-facility/municipalliquidity-facility-faq (last visited Oct. 23, 2021).
251. See supra Section III.A.
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would create moral hazard problems and incentivize state
politicians to externalize their costs and overspend again in the
future. Crises caused by the second type of reasons, on the other
hand, are out of the control of states. States do not instigate national
recessions, and they have little control over fiscal federal policies.
Thus, enabling states to request a loan to help them cope with crises
that result from the second type of reasons should not cause moral
hazard problems and may be extremely helpful to state and
national economies.
Theoretically, Congress can (and perhaps should) also provide
the states with fiscal assistance. The purpose of adding the
suggested direct Fed channel is to allow states to bypass the slow,
political congressional stimulus legislation. As we saw with respect
to ARRA and CARES, and as we have seen with respect to the
second COVID-19 stimulus, the stimulus legislation process is
lengthy and not always motivated by relevant economic
considerations. Indeed, Congress might refuse to help states due to
irrelevant considerations (as it did with respect to the second
COVID-19 stimulus), or it may allocate funds to the decisionmakers’ constituencies rather than to the economically eligible (as
in the legislation of ARRA and CARES). Enabling states ex ante to
directly approach the Fed would add a professional check and
balance. It would establish pre-set conditions for states to be able to
receive federal assistance, even when politicians are engaged in
political struggles and partisan conflicts.
For these purposes, the Fed has two important advantages.
First, it is an apolitical and highly professional agency that by its
nature is isolated from political pressures.252 The Fed regularly
decides economic matters that are of high political importance (such
as the interest rate, monetary easements, and bank regulation), and
it is structured to follow, to the best of its ability, economic rather
than political criteria. All in all, the Fed seems capable of appraising
the reasons a state entered into a fiscal crisis objectively deciding
whether the state should receive federal aid. Second, as per the
Federal Reserve Act, the Fed’s mission is to promote the “goals of
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term

252. Why Is It Important to Separate Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Decisions from Political
Influence?, FED. RSRV. (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/why-is-itimportant-to-separate-federal-reserve-monetary-policy-decisions-from-political-influence.htm.
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interest rates.”253 Since these are the measuring sticks by which the
Fed is generally judged, it has the institutional interest to make a
correct decision with respect to state aid. On one hand, it would not
approve lending that might cause moral hazard or inflation
problems, but on the other hand, it would approve it when
extending such credit is necessary to increase employment and
promote consumption and spending to recover from a recession.
In addition, I suggest allowing the Fed to condition an
emergency loan on the implementation of certain reforms. The
Fed could require states to amend collective bargaining
agreements, cut certain budgetary items or increase others, and it
would be able to reject the state’s loan request if it refused to
implement such reforms. Enabling the Fed to make such demands
would further reduce moral hazard problems and help hasten
states’ economic recovery.254
Again, it is not my aim to construct the exact terms of a Fed
lending program. I merely wish to argue that enabling states to
independently approach the Fed to ask for an emergency loan has
the potential to mitigate the political agency problems of
discretionary stabilizers. Both the states and Congress will know ex
ante that distressed states, which are not responsible to the fiscal
crisis they undergo, have an opportunity to access federal funds,

253. See Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act (“The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of
the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to
increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”).
254. It is not clear, though, whether such conditioning is constitutionally permissible.
In several cases, it was established that it may be unconstitutional to withhold federal funds
due to a state’s refusal to implement federal policies. See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Barr, 961 F.3d
882, 908 (7th Cir. 2020). In this case, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Trump administration
cannot condition a federal formula grant on the implementation of certain immigration
policies. For a more elaborate analysis, see Meryl Chertoff, City of Chicago v. Barr: A
Victory for Sanctuary Jurisdictions and 21st Century Federalism, GEO. L. (2020),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/salpal/explainer-city-of-chicago-v-barr/. The Supreme
Court, for example, invalidated part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that
allowed the federal government to withhold existing Medicaid funding if states would not
regulate according to federal instructions. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2606–08 (2012); Skeel, Is Bankruptcy the Answer?, supra note 20, at 1065. However, in
contrast with these precedents, here the states would have a genuine choice as to whether to
accept or reject the Fed’s credit offer. It would be the states that requested the emergency
credit, and the federal government would not withhold funds that the state was receiving or
was entitled to receive under any federal program.
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and when such funds are indeed necessary, states will receive them
even when their provision is not politically popular.
CONCLUSION
State fiscal crises are prevalent. Every couple of years, usually a
short while after a national recession strikes, states suffer from
economic distress, and discussions begin as to the appropriate
policy response. The legal literature, as well as the public and
political debate, has thus far focused on three policy options: state
bankruptcy, state default (outside bankruptcy) or ex-post federal
bailout. These measures by their very nature, are applied ex post
after the state crisis has developed. The state reaches a point when
it is unable to pay back its debts or it is unable to provide essential
services, and only then (ex post) politicians, either in the federal
level (in case of bailout) or in the state level (in case of default or
bankruptcy), respond accordingly. In this Article I suggested to
depart from these ex post mechanisms, and to advance ex ante policy
measures to address state crises. The suggested measures should
be adopted before a crisis occurs, and they should be triggered
according to pre-determined conditions, and only when the crisis
is caused due to reasons over which the state has little control.
The discussed ex ante measures, especially the automatic
stabilizers, are not a new idea.255 They were raised in the past, as
early as the 1940s, mainly as a mechanism to help the national
economy’s recovery, without relying on politicians’ discretionary
decision-making. The Article suggests that the implementation of
such measures is no less, or even more, important at the state level.
As the current crisis so aptly demonstrates, both state economies
and the national economy suffer dearly because politicians cannot
decide how to address state crises, and Congressional deadlocks
delay much needed state assistance. Even when the assistance
arrives, it arrives too little too late. It is high time to develop a more
transparent and professional mechanism for dispensing federal aid
to states.

255. See Blanchard, supra note 214, at 69 (“Automatic stabilizers are a very old idea.
Indeed, they are a very old, very Keynesian, idea. At the same time, they fit well with the
current mistrust of discretionary policy and the focus on policy rules. Yet in the last ten years,
they have not been discussed much by academics.”).
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